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Abstract 
Although geographic proximity is not enough to imply similar social, political and 
economic outcomes, the Portuguese and Spanish development experiences have been quite alike 
since the 15th century and in particular during the post-WWII period.  Since 1950, both countries 
went through significant market transformations, ranging from democratization to market 
liberalization and adhesion to the European Union.  However, even today, these economies, and 
in particular Portugal, do not rival those of the more developed European countries.  This 
dissertation contributes to the growing body of literature on the Iberian economies by presenting 
three essays that employ modern macroeconomics tools to further our understanding about the 
growth and development experiences of these countries.  The first essay provides a detailed 
growth accounting exercise and reconciles the results with the political and socioeconomic 
context of the 1950-2004 period.  Since Total Factor Productivity is identified as the main engine 
of growth, the second essay explores a quantitative measure for the level of barriers that each 
country faced in the process of adopting new technologies.  The numerical experiments suggest 
that Spain had consistently lower barriers than Portugal and that the gap has been increasing 
since the establishment of the European Single Market.  The last essay investigates the role of 
fiscal policy and, specifically, if distortionary taxes on capital and labor income may have been a 
key factor behind the observed volatility for factor inputs.  The simulation results derived from 
several potential scenarios support this conjuncture.  Additionally, the last essay contributes by 
offering a time series for the levels of effective tax rates on labor and capital income in the 
Iberian economies over the 1975-2004 period. 
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ESSAY 1 - Growth Accounting in the Iberian Political and 
Socioeconomic Context after World War II 
 2 
1.1. Introduction 
 
During the 15th and 16th centuries, Spain and Portugal were the major economic, political 
and cultural powers of Europe, sharing the world according to the 1492 Treaty of Tordesillas.  
Alas, leadership proved difficult to maintain and between the 17th and 19th centuries. The 
balance of power moved toward northern European states and the Iberian nations became 
relatively backward.  The early 20th century saw further stagnation and lengthy periods of 
dictatorship rule. However, after WWII and in particular during the 1960s, the reconstruction of 
Europe led to an extraordinary period of growth in the old continent. Portugal and Spain were no 
exception, experiencing their golden years during the 1960-1973 period.  
The worldwide effects of the 1973 oil shock along with a long and costly colonial war 
fostered the Portuguese discontent with the dictatorial regime.  The increasing social and 
economic unrest culminated in the Carnation Revolution of April 25th, 1974, and initiated the so-
called third wave of democratization in the world (Huntington, 1997).  Coincidentally, Francisco 
Franco died in November 1975 and Spain initiated a similar democratization process, despite 
restoring to King Juan Carlos, who in the meantime had been exiled in Portugal, the role of Chief 
of State. 
Not surprisingly, the young democracies had a checkered start.  The striving for power by 
newly established political parties along with weakened institutions resulted in a period of 
political and economic instability.  In the first two years after the revolution there were six 
provisional governments in Portugal, followed by eight constitutional governments during the 
1976-1983 period. 
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Spain, on the other hand, was able to manage the transition in a relatively less turbulent 
manner.  More specifically, in their attempt to end hostilities between the new and the old 
politics, Spain followed a negotiated model of transition to democracy where, according to 
Colomer (1991), negotiations and pacts among political elites and consensus among citizenry 
avoided acts of revenge, violent confrontations, and civil war.  Despite relative stability during 
the early years, Tejero’s failed coup d’état in 1981 uncovered the political and social fragilities 
of a young democracy.   
Currency crises in the early 1980s shattered both economies and shortly after a sluggish 
and mild recovery came the joint adhesion to the European Community in 1986.  The favorable 
oil shock and the massive inflow of European structural funds prompted economic performance 
until the 1992 widespread recession. At this time, in addition to the already challenging 
economic conditions, the Maastricht treaty imposed severe fiscal and monetary policy constraints 
to meet the criteria for adopting the euro currency a decade later. 
The dynamic of economic transformations did not stop.  In 1994, the establishment of the 
European Single Market and resulting free mobility of goods, services, capital and labor, marked 
the beginning of an era characterized by increasing exposure to international competition. 
Most recently, between 2000 and 2004, a series of international developments impacted 
the Iberian Economies.  These events included, for example, the international stock market crash 
in March of 2000, and a gradual increase in oil prices along with worsening terms of trade.  
Based on the above, each Iberian country seems to routinely experience what the other 
does.  However, even today, these economies, and in particular Portugal, do not rival those of the 
more developed members of the European Union.   
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The purpose of this essay is to present a detailed examination of the post-WWII Iberian 
development experiences and to identify the main drivers and deterrents of growth. With this 
goal in mind, a standard growth accounting framework will be employed and the quantitative 
results consolidated with the political and socioeconomic context.   
To our knowledge, this essay contributes to the literature by offering a comprehensive 
growth accounting exercise for the Iberian countries that contemplates two potential capital 
accumulation processes (linear and exponential) along with two different capital depreciation 
regimes.  Consequently, we examine four different capital construction scenarios and assess the 
sensitivity of the growth accounting results for the entire 1950-2004 period.  
The text is structured as follows.  Section 1.2. derives the growth accounting 
methodology.  Section 1.3. describes the data and the calibration procedure.  Section 1.4. 
provides a detailed assessment of the Iberian political and socioeconomic context, and 
macroeconomic indicators. Section 1.5. discusses the growth accounting results and Section 1.6 
concludes. 
 
1.2. Growth Accounting Methodology 
The usefulness of growth accounting is to identify the main sources and deterrents of 
growth for a given economy during a specific time interval.  Like most of the economic 
techniques, it oversimplifies the number of variables that could impact a country’s performance, 
mainly due to constraints in data collection and availability.  The accounting exercise presented 
in this study focuses on assessing whether differences in growth performance between Portugal 
and Spain arise mostly due to differences in paths for factor inputs or total factor productivity. 
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Notwithstanding, it provides valuable quantitative insights about potential growth related issues 
and a coherent methodology to perform cross-country comparisons.  
This essay adopts the framework used by Bergoeing et al. (2002) and Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002) to perform similar growth accounting exercises for other countries.  Real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) is assumed to follow a relationship quantified by the standard Cobb-
Douglas production function, αα −= 1tttt LKAY , where at any time t, the quantity of output 
available ( tY ) depends on employed levels of labor ( tL ) and capital ( tK ), the marginal 
contribution of each factor input (α for capital), as well as on total factor productivity ( tA ).  In 
this set up, the latter component, also known as the Solow residual, captures technological 
progress and other elements that contribute toward output which are not accounted for as capital 
or labor.  Another noteworthy aspect of this output formulation is that it exhibits constant returns 
to scale because the marginal contributions of the factor inputs add up to one, meaning that if 
each input changes by a scalar, z, then output changes by an equal proportion, and vice-versa. 
As commonly agreed, when performing country comparisons it is appropriate to use per 
capita measures.  Here, the number of hours available for work by working age persons ( tN ) is 
used as a proxy for the population and tL  is redefined as the number of hours actually worked.  
To express output in per capita terms, the Cobb-Douglas production has been rearranged as 
follows.   
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In addition, to decompose the growth rate of output per capita in terms of changes in the capital-
output ratio and the employment rate it is convenient to express the above relationship in 
logarithmic form (Hayashi and Prescott, 2002). 
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(1.2) 
Equation (1.2) is the key formula for growth accounting exercises since it allows one to 
estimate the contributions of each factor input and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) on the growth 
rate of output per capita. 
1.3. Data and Calibration 
Aggregate levels for real GDP, tY , investment, tI , during the 1950-2004 period were 
computed based on data from Penn World Table version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006) for real GDP 
per capita, population and the percentage of real GDP per capita allocated toward investment.1  
Values for aggregate consumption, tC , were calibrated using ttt IYC −= .  Data on tN  and tL  
and α are from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre’s Total Economy Database 
(2008).  Hence, α is set at 0.3 based on historical averages for both countries.2  The depreciation 
rate, δ , is set initially at a 5 percent rate, similar to Bergoing et al. (2002), and later at 10 percent 
in order to assess the results’ sensitivity to the depreciation rate assumptions.  
The next step involved generating a series for the capital stock following the standard 
capital motion equation (Bergoing et al., 2002), tttt IKK −−=+ )1( 1 δ , where 1950K  was set at 
                                                 
1 Using Penn World Table version 6.2 data, aggregate output per year was computed by multiplying the 
annual values of GDP per capita with total population. Similarly, aggregate investment was set equal to the product 
of GDP per capita times the percentage allocated toward investment and total population.  
2 Standard marginal contribution of capital in macroeconomic analysis. 
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the value mentioned in Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) for Spain and Portugal, respectively.  The 
robustness of the accounting exercise is also tested under an exponential capital accumulation 
function, δδ ttkt IKAK
−
+ =
1
1  (Lucas and Prescott, 1971), where kA  was set at 1.305 based on the 
procedure outlined in Parente and Prescott (2000) and discussed in detailed in Essay 2.  
Succinctly, the value is calibrated assuming the principle of common technology in factor inputs 
across countries, otherwise there would be no discipline in the analysis.3  Consequently, the 
accounting results will be tested under four possible time series for capital stock, derived from 
the set of assumptions for its capital accumulation process and depreciation rates.  Given α , 
tK , tL , and tY , four different series for TFP were computed, using αα −= 1
tt
t
t
LK
Y
A  and the 
assumptions mentioned above regarding the depreciation rate and the motion of capital 
formulation. 
1.4. Iberian Experiences in the Post-WWII Period  
Before engaging the growth accounting exercises, it is useful to understand the main 
social, political and economic events that may also had an impact on the growth and 
development experiences of Portugal and Spain during the post-WWII period.  This assessment 
begins with the characterization of the political and socioeconomic context and then proceeds by 
reconciling this history with the observed path of output per capita, the unemployment rate, 
consumption, investment, capital-output ratios, and TFP. 
 
                                                 
3 See pages 49-50. 
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1.4.1. The Political and Socioeconomic Context 
In 1950, both Portugal and Spain were under consolidated dictatorship regimes.  António 
de Oliveira Salazar had been the prime minister of Portugal since 1932 and had complete control 
over governmental policies.  Similarly, Francisco Franco, another right-wing dictator, had been 
the Spanish head of state since October 1936.  
The roots of these dictatorships followed similar routes.  Salazar started his political 
career as finance minister of the “Ditadura Nacional”, instituted after the 1926 coup d’etat that 
ousted the First Portuguese Republic.  This regime change was followed by Spain a decade later, 
though in a more turbulent manner.  In July 1936, Franco participated in a failed coup d’ etat that 
ousted the Second Spanish Republic and led the country back into civil war.  In the midst of this 
conflict, Franco emerged as the leader of the Nationalists and achieved victory by April 1939 
with the support of Hitler, Mussolini, and Salazar.4 
Until the 1950s both dictatorships pursued similar economic policies, primarily driven by 
import substitution and transformation of the industrial sector.  Alas, the turmoil of the 1930s 
along with WWII inhibited the potential success of these policies and economic performance. 
In the 1960s, the Iberian countries decided to engage in significantly different trade 
policies.  Portugal joined the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and progressively opened 
its economy to the world while Spain remained focused on autarky policies.  Notwithstanding 
different views about international trade, both countries continued to pursue industrial policies 
                                                 
4 The Iberian Pact, signed in March 1939, is another example of the long lived complicity between Portugal 
and Spain.  This pact conveyed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression between Franco and Salazar and insurance 
that both countries would remain neutral during WWII and protect the Iberian Peninsula from any attack. 
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and experienced an unprecedented period of growth from early 1960s until the international 
energy crisis of 1973.5 This period became known as the Iberian golden years (Lopes, 2004a).  
A cursory look at Appendix A reveals that Spanish growth was mainly driven by the 
massive and profound transformation of the industrial sector and dramatic increases in 
productivity.  Industrial productivity increased by 100 percent between 1964 and 1973.  
Particularly impressive was automobile production which increased at an extraordinary pace of 
22 percent per year (Tortella, 2000).  In fact, Tortella (2000) characterizes this period as the 
Spanish industrial revolution, and the automobile sector its leading source because it fostered the 
development of at least three additional industries: rubber production, iron and steel, and 
petroleum refining.  
On the other hand, Portugal focused more on the progressive opening of its economy to 
the world; the merchandise export growth rate between 1959 and 1973 was 11 percent per year 
whereas in industrialized countries it averaged 8.9 percent (Baklanoff, 1992).  Interestingly, an 
analysis of the direction of trade from 1960 to 1972 shows two major trends: the relative decline 
in importance of overseas territories and the growing importance of EFTA in the composition of 
exports and imports (Baklanoff, 1992).  Regardless of the different approaches to international 
trade both Iberian countries experienced significant growth during the 1960-1973 period. 
Despite spending most of the 1960s protecting its domestic industry from international 
competition, in 1968 Spain began to tentatively open its borders.6 Yet, these early steps where 
                                                 
5 Lopes (2004a) indicates that output per capita during the 1960-1973 period grew at an annual average of 
6.9 percent in Portugal and 6.1 percent in Spain, and that these growth rates were significantly higher than those 
experienced by Portugal and Spain during the 1950-1960 period (3.6 and 3.8 percent, respectively) and the 1973-
1994 period (1.9 and 1.7 percent, respectively). 
6 A landmark of such efforts was the 1970 Preferential Trade Agreement with the European Common 
Market which by 1979 turned into full adhesion to EFTA. 
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shadowed by an embarrassing situation to Franco’s regime.  The Spanish dictatorship was 
shaken by a financial scandal involving the minister of finance, the minister of commerce, the 
Bank of Spain’s governor, Opus Dei, and Matesa, a firm that was being used for illegal use of 
export subsidies (Tortella, 2000).  Curiously, at this time Portugal also experienced its first 
glimpse toward the end of dictatorship - illness led to the replacement of Prime Minister Salazar 
by Marcelo Caetano.  Henceforth, the latter and President Américo Tomás assumed a somewhat 
less oppressive posture, particularly in relation to the freedom of expression.  
In the early 1970s, Portugal witnessed an 8.4 percent increase in population prompted by 
the return of Portuguese citizens from disrupted colonies and a spreading malcontent about the 
burden that the colonial war had imposed on the state and families.  These issues along with the 
economic repercussions of the 1973 adverse oil shock, which led to a severe deterioration of the 
Iberian terms of trade because of the high dependency on imports of crude oil, promoted severe 
social and political turmoil which ultimately led to the “Carnation Revolution”.  In 1974, 
Portugal was caught between industrial Europe and colonial Africa, and between an incipient 
decline of corporatism and emerging market capitalism (Baklanoff, 1992). 
The military coup of April 25th 1974 ousted the long-lived authoritarian regime of 
António de Oliveira Salazar (1932-68) and Marcelo Caetano (1968-74), whereas the Spanish 
dictatorship (1939-75) ended with the death of Francisco Franco.  According to Huntington 
(1997), the regime changes in the Iberian Peninsula marked the beginning of the third wave of 
democratization and the age of democracy in the world. 
Both Iberian countries followed a negotiated model of transition to democracy where 
pacts among political elites and consensus among citizenry sought to avoid acts of revenge, 
violent confrontations, and civil war (Colomer, 1991).  In 1975 for example, Spain’s 
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democratization took place by consensus and reconciliation which meant that the new system 
incorporated the previously clandestine anti-Franco opposition along with important continuities 
from the Franco era, especially in the security and military areas (Maxwell, 1991). 
The struggle for power among newly established political parties, along with incipient 
democratic institutions, incubated a period of relative political and socioeconomic instability.  
For example, in the first two years after the revolution there were six provisional governments in 
Portugal, followed by eight constitutional governments during the 1976-1983 period.  Spain, on 
the other hand, experienced a smoother transition process skillfully managed by the new chief of 
state, King Juan Carlos I, who had lived in exile in Portugal until Franco’s death.  But despite the 
apparent stability during the early years, Tejero’s failed coup d’état in 1981 uncovered the 
political and social fragilities of a young democracy. 
The mid-1970s Iberian democratization also led to upheavals in the economic system.  
The Portuguese revolutionaries nationalized commercial banks and most heavy and medium size 
industries in order to emasculate the old elite’s economic base.  Spain, on the other hand, 
implemented less dramatic changes during the early years of democracy mainly due to the fact 
that the new middle class was dismayed with the impact that radical economic measures had had 
on the Portuguese economy (Baklanoff, 1978).  Consequently, priority was given to stop-gap 
economic measures such as the Moncloa Pacts, which assured a degree of moderation for 
increases in prices and salaries (Tortella, 2000). 
Currency and banking crises in the early 1980s shattered both economies.  Portugal’s 
balance of payments deficit was the main reason for two consecutive currency crises, namely in 
1977 and 1983.  In both cases, the Portuguese were assisted by the International Monetary Fund 
which required it to implement fiscal and monetary policy constraints (Nunes and Valerio, 
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2005).  Across the border, the 1978-1985 banking crisis in Spain was one of the worst in Europe 
and affected 58 banks, which together accounted for 27 percent of deposits (Chislett, 2008).  The 
crisis originated in a high volume of non-performing loans linked to an industrial meltdown 
following the inflationary episodes prompted by the adverse oil shocks in the 1970s.  The 
solution comprised, among other things, new regulatory measures by the Bank of Spain 
regarding solvency requirements and compliance.  
Shortly after a sluggish and mild recovery came the joint adhesion to the European 
Community in 1986.  Lower oil prices along with the inflow of European structural funds, 
foreign direct investment, gradual privatization of state monopolies, deregulation of prices and 
markets fostered economic performance until the 1992 recession in Western Europe.  On top of 
this widespread contraction, the Maastricht treaty imposed additional constraints on fiscal and 
monetary policy in order to transition to the euro currency a decade later.  The criteria to adhere 
to the European Monetary Union included: “inflation over 12 months could not exceed by more 
than 1.5 percentage points the average rate among the three EC countries with the lowest 
inflation; long-term nominal interest rates over 12 months could not exceed by more than 2 
percentage points the average for the same three countries; the currency had to remain in the 
narrow band of the exchange rate mechanism for at least two years without devaluation; the 
budget deficit should not exceed 3 percent of GDP; and total public debt could not exceed 60 
percent of GDP” (Maxwell and Spiegel, 1994, p.51). 
The Maastricht rules along with the continuous inflow of EU transfers helped to reduce 
the public sector deficit but the 1994 establishment of the European Single Market and resulting 
free mobility of goods, services, capital and labor, marked the beginning of an era characterized 
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by increasing exposure of domestic industries to international competition.7  The latter along 
with several reforms imposed by joining the single market, spanning from environmental quality 
to consumer protection, further exacerbated the challenges facing domestic firms (Torres, 2000). 
The competitiveness of some Iberian businesses could not be more bluntly tested. One of the 
outcomes was the relocation of less competitive businesses to countries with lower labor costs 
(Lopes, 2004b) and a deepening of the trade deficit, particularly after 1997 (WDI, 2006). 
Despite these challenges, both countries experienced modest growth in the late 1990s, 
probably nourished by the continuing privatization of parastate industries and market 
deregulation.8 It is worth mentioning that Portugal was at the time one of the largest “privatizers” 
in the OECD, with revenues amounting to approximately 2.8, 4.7, 3.9, and 1.5 percent of GDP 
between 1996 and 1999 (Torres, 2000). 
Between 2000 and 2004, a series of international adversities impacted the Iberian 
economies. These included, for example, the international stock market crash in March of 2000 
and the gradual increase in oil prices along with worsening terms of trade. Relatively, Spain 
ended up better off probably due to its lower degree of openness. 
 
1.4.2. Macroeconomic Indicators 
Given the Iberian political and socioeconomic history just outlined, this essay proceeds 
by studying its potential relationship with the path of macroeconomic indicators. This section 
begins by assessing output per capita and employment rates followed by an analysis of the levels 
                                                 
7 In Portugal and Spain, EU transfers accounted for 1.5 to 3 percent of GDP per year during the second half 
of the 1990s (Allard et al., 2008). 
8 Parastate industries are those not reporting directly to the state but funded by the state. 
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of consumption, investment, and the estimated levels of capital-output and TFP during the period 
of interest. 
 
1.4.2.1. Output per Capita 
Figure 1.A depicts real GDP per hour of work available, which is being used as a proxy 
for real GDP per capita. As shown below, there are striking similarities in the path of output per 
capita, despite Spain’s being always higher than Portugal’s. 
The 1950s were harsh times for most economies around the world and the Iberian 
experiences were no exception. The economic repercussions of WWII and the long 
reconstruction process constrained the economic performance of most countries. Despite the 
overall sluggish performance, Spain was able to perform better than Portugal.  In 1950, the 
Spanish’s output per capita was 37 percent higher than the Portuguese and this gap increased by 
1960, reaching 41 percent.  
 
Figure 1.A  Output per Capita 
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In the 1960s most of the European economic base had been rebuilt leading to an overall 
recovery in the demand for goods and services. These facts along with the continued Iberian 
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industrialization efforts fostered a period of unprecedented growth.  As mentioned in the 
previous section, during the 1960s Portugal and Spain had a different view about the role of 
international trade. While Portugal engaged in the progressive opening of its economy to the 
world, Spain remained focused on import substitution policies. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that the Portuguese merchandise export growth rate averaged 11 percent per year over the 1959-
1973 period while in most industrialized countries it was 8.9 percent (Baklanoff, 1992).  Spain, 
on the other hand, while not experiencing such a high overall growth rate in exports, saw its 
automobile production increasing at an extraordinary pace of 22 percent per year (Tortella, 
2000).  Using output per capita as a measure of comparative policy success, it appears that the 
Portuguese did a better job because the output per capita gap shrunk to 21 percent by 1974.  
As shown in Figure 1.A, the democratization process impacted the Portuguese economy 
more severely than the Spanish, especially during the first two years.  This occurrence might 
have been related to the fact that, besides political instability and economic reforms, the 
dismemberment of the colonial empire resulted in the loss of a significant source of income for 
the Portuguese (Baklanoff, 1992).  Spain, on the other hand, was able to buffer the potential 
adverse shock of democratization on output per capita because it had a smoother political 
transition and implemented less dramatic economic reforms (Baklanoff, 1978).  Overall, the 
political and economic turbulence during the first decade of democracy resulted in a relative 
stagnation in the levels of output per capita in the Iberian countries.  However, in the midst of the 
turmoil, Portugal was able to gain on the Spanish output per capita by cutting the Spanish 
advantage to only 16 percent by 1986.  This gain probably arose because of the increase in 
unemployment in Spain, as it will be discussed later on. 
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Soon after the adhesion to the European Community both economies went through a new 
expansionary period, this time prompted by a favorable oil shock, the inflow of structural funds 
and privatizations.  Portugal was able to shrink the output per capital gap against Spain further, 
driving the disparity to 14 percent by 1991.  Alas, by the next year a widespread recession hit 
Western Europe, the Maastricht Treaty was signed and the Iberian economies were obliged to 
comply with fiscal and monetary constraints. All these events led to a reversal in the output per 
capita curve. Interestingly, the relative level of output per capita in the Iberian economies shrunk 
further, reaching 12 percent in 1992. 
The year 1994 marks the beginning of a new era characterized by increased exposure to 
international competition and free mobility of goods, services, labor and capital among the 
European Union member states. In this year, Spain had a level of output per capita merely 10 
percent higher than Portugal.  As portrayed in Figure 1.A., it seems that Spain was better 
prepared for this challenge and consequently was able to grow faster than Portugal during the 
first decade of European Single Market membership. The relatively better Spanish performance 
pushed the gap in output per capita back up to 13 percent by 2004. 
Given that both Iberian countries benefited from the inflow of structural funds, were 
obliged to implement identical reforms, and faced similar external shocks, one speculative 
explanation for the Portuguese inability to perform as well as Spaniards in recent years might be 
related to the scarcity of skilled labor.  In fact, between 1993 and 2003, only 10 percent of the 
Portuguese labor force had tertiary education whereas in Spain this share accounted for 24 
percent (WDI, 2006). 
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1.4.2.2. The Employment Rate 
In terms of employment, the situation was relatively stable in the Iberian economies 
throughout the entire 1950-1974 period, as depicted in Figure 1.B.9  However, massive 
emigration motivated by attractive worker programs during the reconstruction of Central Europe 
may have buffered any potential adversities, particularly in Portugal.  As Baklanoff (1992) noted, 
Portuguese emigration provided a safety valve for open and disguised unemployment, 
particularly in rural areas.  It is noteworthy, that Portuguese emigration was not only fostered by 
attractive foreign remuneration packages, but also the willingness of many young men to avoid 
recruitment for the colonial war, initiated in 1961 with the outbreak of guerilla warfare in Angola 
and in the other African territories. 
On the other hand, massive public investment associated with development plans 
implemented throughout the 1950-1974 period probably prompted the creation of jobs.  
Whatever the true reasons behind the stability of the Portuguese employment rate, the fact is that 
15.6 percent of the Portuguese population emigrated during the 1960-1973 period whereas in 
Spain this figure accounted for only 2.2 percent of the population during the 1960s (Appendix 
A). 
 
                                                 
9 The ratio of hours actually worked versus available hours to work is being used as a proxy for the 
employment rate. 
 18 
Figure 1.B  Employment Rate 
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The Iberian democratization process initiated in the mid 1970s marked the beginning of a 
period where the volatility of the employment rate increased, especially in Spain.  During this 
period, the latter experienced high and persistent unemployment rates probably due to relatively 
higher levels of unemployment benefits which fostered the agent’s preference for leisure. 
Blanchard’s (1995, p.216-7) argument for the different labor market experiences in Spain and 
Portugal goes as follows:  
 
“In Spain, high employment protection and unemployment benefits have 
led to small effects of labor market conditions on wages. This led to large 
adverse effects of disinflation on unemployment in the first half of the 1980s. 
And high persistence since then explains why unemployment has remained high 
since. In Portugal, in contrast, low unemployment benefits have led, despite the 
presence of high employment protection, to a higher response of wages to 
unemployment. This has led to smaller adverse effects of disinflation on 
unemployment. And it has led to less unemployment persistence.”  
 
Adhesion to the European Community in 1986 and the resulting structural investments 
may have been behind the shortly lived upswing in the employment rate. Unfortunately, the 1992 
European recession facilitated the return of the downward pressure. However, the previously 
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noted relative readiness of Spanish firms for the European Single Market could be one of the 
factors explaining the upward trend on Spanish employment over the next decade. 
 
1.4.2.3. Consumption and Investment 
The striking similarities between Portugal and Spain observed in the output per capita 
ratios also hold in the levels of consumption and investment per capita, as depicted in Figure 
1.C.10  Not surprisingly, given that Spain experienced higher levels of output per capita than 
Portugal, the same higher levels are seen in the consumption and investment data.  Another 
interesting observation is that the Iberian consumption and investment data confirms a stylized 
fact in macroeconomics: consumption is less volatile than investment. 
Notwithstanding the similarities delineated above, the path of investment in Portugal and 
Spain exhibits some relevant disparities, particularly during the post-dictatorship period.  In the 
1974-1986 period, investment per capita in Spain experienced a steady decline probably due to 
the similar trend in the employment rate while Portugal’s investment level recorded a rapid 
decrease in the first two years of democracy, followed by a significant increase until 1983 and 
another steep decline during the next three years.  These fluctuations seem to indicate that the 
Carnation Revolution created a two-year wave of unusual willingness to consume (shown later 
on in Figure 1.D), probably due to high expectations about future income during democratic 
times and the ensuing economic reforms.  However, these changes were short-lived as the 
Portuguese perceptions adjusted and investment per capita returned to the early 1970s levels. 
 
                                                 
10 Computed based on Penn World Table (2006) and GGDC (2008) data and author’s computations 
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Figure 1.C  Consumption and Investment per Capita 
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The decline in investment per capita experienced during the 1983-1986 period in Portugal 
could have resulted from the IMF intervention following the 1981-1983 currency crisis, which 
imposed serious fiscal and monetary constraints to offset the balance of payments deficit and in 
turn constrained the levels of public investment.  Later on, the divergence recorded in the post-
2000 period was mostly likely related to the higher degree of openness of the Portuguese 
economy relative to the Spanish because the series of adverse international shocks recorded at 
this time, namely the stock market crash in March of 2000 and the gradual worsening of the 
terms of trade due to higher energy costs, left the Portuguese economy relatively worse off.   
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In order to further investigate these fluctuations, the average propensities to consume and 
to save were computed using the consumption-output and investment-output ratios as proxies for 
those measures. The results are displayed in Figure 1.D. 
 
Figure 1.D  Average Propensities to Consume and Save 
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The figure corroborates the discussion just outlined for the observed fluctuations in the 
investment per capita ratios during the post-1974 period by revealing the tradeoffs between the 
willingness to consume and invest during each cycle.  In particular, the spikes in the Portuguese 
average to consume initiated in 1974, 1983 and 2000, and the resulting crowding-out effects in 
the saving rate.  Figure 1.D also indicates that on average the Spaniards have a lower propensity 
to consume and a higher propensity to save than the Portuguese.  The latter inference could 
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explain the persistent higher level of output per capita in Spain because the higher savings rate 
yields greater investment and production capacity.  We now turn to this possibility by 
investigating the capital to output ratios. 
 
1.4.2.4. Capital-Output Ratio 
The Iberian capital-output ratios presented here are based on the calibration procedure 
described in Section 1.3.  Briefly, these ratios were computed based on four different potential 
scenarios widely used in macroeconomic analysis which basically combine the assumptions that 
capital accumulation could follow a linear or exponential process and that the depreciation rate is 
expected to be between 5 to 10 percent.  Following this approach, four different series for 
capital-output ratios will be suggested below in order to give a more detailed description about 
the potential true values of the capital-output ratios in the Iberian economies.  The presentation 
first investigates simulated series for the capital-output ratios under a linear accumulation 
process allowing the depreciation rate to be either 5 or 10 percent and then investigates two 
additional series based on the assumption that capital accumulation follows an exponential 
process constrained by the same two levels of depreciation rate. 
Figure 1.E plots the estimated capital-output ratios based on the assumption that capital is 
accumulated in a linear fashion.  Regardless of the calibrated depreciation rate, throughout the 
1950s and most of the 1960s, the estimated capital-output ratio was relatively higher in Portugal, 
suggesting that during this period output production in Spain was less capital-intensive.  
However, the late 1960s indicate a switch in positions, with Spain becoming consistently more 
capital-intensive than Portugal until the early 2000s. 
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Figure 1.E  Capital-output Ratio with Linear Accumulation Process 
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The switch in relative capital-intensity in the late 1960s is consistent with the political 
and socioeconomic history delineated in Section 1.4.1. as well as with the divergence in the 
levels of investment per capita observed throughout the 1960s (Figure 1.C).  At this time, Franco 
implemented several policies aimed at industrialization and import substitution such as the 1960 
highly protectionist tariffs, the 1961 law on Top Priority Industries, and the 1964 Development 
Plan (Appendix A).  The fact that Spain overcame the Portuguese capital-output ratio advantage 
is probably an indicator of these policies’ success. 
The argument just outlined is also valid when capital is assumed to follow an exponential 
accumulation process and a 10 percent depreciation rate, as depicted in Figure 1.F.  For the case 
when the depreciation rate is set at 5 percent, the leadership switch in the levels capital-output 
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ratios is delayed until 1978.  Nonetheless, despite the timing, all simulations indicate a switch in 
the relative ratios of capital-output during the 1950-2004 period, and Portugal catching-up by 
2003-2004. 
 
Figure 1.F  Capital-output Ratio with Exponential Accumulation Process 
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By comparing the estimates obtained under the two different assumptions for the capital 
accumulation process it is clear that the levels of the ratios are higher for the latter simulations.  
This is a direct result of the exponential capital accumulation process, δδ ttkt IKAK
−
+ =
1
1 , because 
it imposes an adjustment cost and therefore implies a preference for smoother investment 
patterns.  As depicted in Figure 1.C, the data suggests that this assumption about the capital 
accumulation process probably does not hold since the investment per capita ratios present some 
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degree of volatility.  Therefore, it might be the case that the capital-output ratios estimated under 
the linear accumulation process are closer to the true values.  
 
1.4.2.5. Total Factor Productivity 
Given the capital-output ratios, data on aggregate output, labor markets, and the marginal 
contribution of capital, four different series for TFP were computed based on the calibration 
procedure described in Section 1.3.  If TFP, in the standard Cobb-Douglas production function, 
can be interpreted as a proxy for available technology and loosely defined as everything else, 
“residual growth”, that enables a certain level of output except for the observed contributions of 
capital and labor, then there is a myriad of factors than can impact it.  Hall and Jones (1999) 
argue that TFP depends heavily on the quality of the social infrastructure because in their view a 
good infrastructure facilitates the adoption of new ideas and technologies.  On the other hand, 
Parente and Prescott (1994, 2000, 2005) claim that TFP is primarily driven by potential barriers 
to technological adoption such as regulatory and legal constraints, bribes that must be paid, 
violence or the threat of violence, outright sabotage, and worker strikes. In this essay, we will 
focus on estimating the path of TFP and briefly speculate about its fluctuations.  However, Essay 
2 will study this issue in-depth  
The presentation of the estimated levels of TFP will follow the previous layout, i.e. we 
will start by assessing the estimated levels when capital is assumed to accumulate in a linear 
fashion and then we will discuss the TFP estimates attained when imposing capital accumulation 
to follow an exponential process. 
As depicted below, Figure 1.G indicates that Spain consistently had better technology 
than Portugal over the 1950-2004 period if we assume that the capital accumulation process is 
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linear.  These estimates could also corroborate the Spain’s ability to consistently achieve higher 
levels of output per capita than the Portuguese since the former would be able to produce more 
even if they had just the same amounts of inputs as the latter.  
 
Figure 1.G  Total Factor Productivity with Linear Capital Accumulation 
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Figure 1.G. also shows that in the 1974-1976 and 1982-1984 periods there were 
significant declines in the Portuguese levels of TFP. Before turning to the discussion of these 
downturns, let us verify if these also hold when the motion of capital is assumed to follow an 
exponential formulation.  Figure 1.H plots the estimates under the latter assumption. 
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Figure 1.H  Total Factor Productivity with Exponential Capital Accumulation 
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Comparing both Figure 1.G and 1.H we can confirm that regardless of the capital 
accumulation process, the estimated levels of TFP are inversely related to the depreciation rates 
assumed, and as expected, this relationship being more explicit for the case of an exponential 
capital accumulation process.11  Moreover, all the scenarios delineated above indicate the 1974-
1976 and 1982-1984 TFP divergences previously mentioned.  The variation in available 
technology is probably associated with the social and economic stress experienced in each 
period. The 1974-1976 period corresponds to the start of the democratization in Portugal and the 
process of massive nationalizations aimed at emasculating the old elite's economic base.  
                                                 
11 This is obvious because the series were constructed based on the methodology outline in Section 1.3. 
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Moreover, as previously outlined, this increased economic uncertainty and investment per capita 
shrunk (Figure 1.C).  Hence, it is not surprising that these changes may have disrupted TFP.  In 
the 1982-1984 period Portugal was in the midst of a currency crisis which required the correction 
of the balance of payments deficit through strict fiscal and monetary policies.  Among the 
widespread repercussions, there was a significant decrease in public investment along with the 
overall decrease in investment per capita (Figure 1.C) which in turn may have had an adverse 
effect on TFP. 
Despite the similar political and socioeconomic context, Spain was able to keep its 
relative technological advantage throughout the 1950-2004 period, regardless of the assumption 
employed to compute TFP estimates.  Overall, it appears that when it comes to technological 
adoption Spain has been able to do a better job than Portugal despite potential economic and 
political challenges.  As discussed earlier, the democratization process and the adhesion to the 
European Single Market were some examples of how the Spanish skillfully managed adversities.  
 
1.5. Growth Accounting Results 
Besides the analysis of the political and socioeconomic context and the performance of 
key macroeconomic indicators, the decomposition of the observed growth in output per capita 
into the contributions of factor inputs and technological change adds depth to our understanding 
of the Iberian experiences.  The estimates proposed in this section are mostly grounded on the 
growth accounting methodology developed in Bergoing et al. (2002) and Hayashi and Prescott 
(2002), as described in sections 1.2. and 1.3.  The discussion starts by identifying periods of 
fundamental changes in the economic structure of Portugal and Spain based on the political and 
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socioeconomic background and the corroborating view of others, followed by the presentation of 
the growth accounting results for each of the four scenarios delineated in the previous section. 
 
1.5.1. Regime Changes 
Regime changes occur when there are fundamental changes in the modus operandi of a 
given economy.12 These can be motivated by different events such as profound changes in 
regulation, radical fiscal and monetary reforms, democratization, technological shocks, military 
conflict, natural disasters, etc., all of which have the potential to significantly alter the pattern of 
economic behavior. 
The political and socioeconomic history and macroeconomic indicators of the Iberian 
economies point to four regime changes during the 1950-2004 period for each country. The first 
relevant change occurred in 1960 when Portugal adopted a policy of progressive opening of its 
economy to the world while Spain implemented highly protectionist tariffs and deepened its 
focus on import substitution and industrialization of the economic base. Despite the different 
economic outlooks, both countries experienced an extraordinary period of growth which became 
known as the Iberian golden years.  Another radical change was prompted by the 
democratization process and its social and economic repercussions. However, these happened in 
different years for each country. For Portugal the regime change came in 1974 while for Spain it 
began in 1975. 
Later on, both countries joined the European Community in 1986 and submitted 
themselves to radical reforms, either through market liberalization policies or major 
infrastructure projects subsidized by European structural funds.  The process continued 
                                                 
12 Not necessarily due to a change of government. 
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throughout the 1990s and more significant changes were yet to come.  The 1994 adhesion to the 
European Single Market and European Union sustained another regime change since it exposed 
domestic firms to an unprecedented exposure to international competition and severely 
constrained fiscal and monetary policy in order to join the Eurozone. 
The regime changes just delineated are supported by the analysis of other researchers. 
Lopes (2004a) defines the period 1960-1973 as the Portuguese golden years and Blakanoff 
(1992) concludes that the 1974 Portuguese revolution marked the end of the exceptionally rapid 
economic growth and structural change initiated in 1960. Tortella (2000) argues that 1960 was 
the beginning of an extraordinary growth period in Spain. Cheung and Chinn (1996), Fulvio 
(2001), and Escosura e Roses (2007), found that in 1975 there is a statistically significant break 
in the Spanish growth trend. Lopes (2004a) identifies the period 1986-94 as a complete business 
cycle for the Portuguese economy. Jimeno et al. (2006) point to 1986 as the year when there was 
a structural break in Spanish labor productivity growth, using a Sup-Wald test. Finally, Gunther 
et al. (2004) state that the Spanish economic expansion of the late 1980s came to an abrupt end 
by 1994 and was then followed by a strong recovery based on fiscal reform and an influx of 
structural investment funds from the EU (2004). 
Having identified four major regime changes in Spain and Portugal between 1950 and 
2004, the next task is to answer the following question: did the disparities in growth between 
Portugal and Spain arise mostly due to differences in the paths for factor inputs - like capital and 
labor - or due to differences in TFP?  
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1.5.2. Growth Accounting Results with Linear Capital Accumulation 
The growth accounting exercises provide estimates based on the methodology outlined in 
Section 1.2. and 1.3, the four scenarios outlined in Section 1.4, and the four regime changes just 
delineated.  We being our analysis with two simulations which focus on the case when capital 
accumulates in a linear fashion, i.e. tttt IKK −−=+ )1( 1 δ . The sensitivity of the results is 
assessed by setting the capital depreciation rate, δ , at 5 and 10 percent, respectively.   
Table 1.A shows the growth accounting estimates computed using equation (1.2) and 
assuming linear capital accumulation with a 5 percent depreciation rate.   
 
Table 1.A  Growth Accounting Estimates (δ = 5%; linear capital accumulation) 
Country Time Period %∆(Y/N) Due to TFP Due to K/Y Due to L/N 
Portugal 1950-1959 4.11 5.97 -0.81 -1.05 
 1960-1973 7.01 6.86 -0.06 0.21 
 1974-1985 1.5313 1.17 0.91 -0.55 
 1986-1993 2.51 1.24 0.24 1.03 
 1994-2004 2.02 0.36 0.90 0.76 
      
 1950-2004 3.95 3.55 0.24 0.16 
      
Spain 1950-1959 4.16 4.33 0.58 -0.75 
 1960-1974 5.65 5.05 0.56 0.04 
 1975-1985 1.58 3.25 0.81 -2.48 
 1986-1993 2.09 1.42 0.41 0.26 
 1994-2004 2.28 -0.39 0.13 2.53 
      
 1950-2004 3.61 3.28 0.51 -0.18 
 
The first thing to note is that the calculations in the third column (%∆(Y/N)) and fifth 
column (Due to L/N ) do not depend on the capital motion assumptions and thus hold no matter 
                                                 
13 Even though the Carnation Revolution was in April 25th 1974, GDP per capita only shrunk significantly 
by 1975.  Consequently, if we were to compare the Iberian growth rates in output per capita during the same 1975-
1985 period, the growth rate in Portugal would have been 2.50 percent, which is significantly higher than the 1.58 
percent rate experienced in Spain over the same time interval. 
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which structure for computing capital is applied.  We begin by focusing on these two columns.  
Column three indicates that output per capita grew at an average annual rate of 3.95 percent in 
Portugal and 3.61 percent in Spain, hence suggesting convergence in output per capita levels 
among the Iberians over the entire 55-year period.  Moreover, the estimates also corroborate the 
extraordinary growth experienced during the golden years and that Portugal grew significantly 
more than Spain over that period, attaining an average annual growth rate 24 percent higher than 
Spain.  The democratization turmoil, energy shocks, and currency crises of the 1970s were quite 
expensive for both countries, with Portugal and Spain growing at a much slower, though similar, 
pace until the European Community adhesion.  Additionally, the output per capita growth rates 
also support the argument that Spain was better prepared for the European Single Market 
challenges than Portugal.  Whereas Portugal grew relatively faster during the 1986-1993, once 
both countries joined the single market, Spain was able to grow at an annual average rate that 
was 13 percent higher than Portugal. 
Column five presents the estimates for the labor contribution toward the growth rate in 
output per capita.  On average, for the entire 1950-2004 period, the contribution of labor was 
rather small in Portugal, and for Spain it ended up being a deterrent.  Actually, during the 1950s, 
labor inhibited growth in both countries and it was relatively more problematic in Portugal since 
the employment rate was somewhat higher in Spain.  During the golden years, labor had a 
positive contribution to the growth rate in output per capita though rather small, particularly in 
Spain.  This relative performance might have been distorted by the massive emigration of 
Portuguese citizens during this period which contracted the labor force and disguised 
unemployment.  The democratization process of the mid 1970s along with several adverse 
shocks also afflicted the Iberian workers, especially the Spaniards. As observed in Figure 1.B, 
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the unemployment rate increased dramatically in Spain since the transition to democracy until 
the European Community adhesion, whereas in Portugal it was fairly stagnant during the same 
period.  
In the 1986-1993 period labor played a role in the upswing of the average output per 
capita growth rate, even though it was more relevant in Portugal than in Spain. This fact is 
consistent with the relative lower unemployment rates in Portugal as well as with its flatter 
employment curve (Figure 1.B) during this period.  Major changes occurred after the adhesion to 
the European Single Market.  Labor became the key engine of growth for the Spanish economy.  
Even though our accounting methodology does not explicitly takes into consideration the role of 
labor efficiency, this change might be associated with the 1982-1994 boom in education 
(Appendix A) and resulting increased ability of the Spanish workers to compete with their 
European counterparts, and especially against the Portuguese workers.  In fact, between 1993 
and 2003, only 10 percent of the Portuguese labor force had tertiary education whereas in Spain 
this share accounted for 24 percent (WDI, 2006). 
We now turn to the more uncertain results which are tied to the capital construction 
approach.  The capital construction approach not only impacts the capital-output ratio, but it will 
also impact the Solow residual (i.e. TFP).  If the capital accumulation process is linear and the 
true depreciation rate is 5 percent, then the adopted methodology indicates that during the overall 
period TFP was significantly more important than the factor inputs, and it grew relatively faster 
in Portugal than in Spain.14  Between 1950 and 2004, the estimated average growth rate for TFP 
was 3.55 percent in Portugal and 3.28 percent in Spain, accounting for about 90 percent of each 
                                                 
14 The dominant role of TFP is a stylized fact in economic growth theory.  
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country’s average annual change in output per capita.  Moreover, TFP was the main driver of 
growth in each time interval under consideration, except for the 1993-2004 period. 
In relation to the contribution of capital, the numerical experiment indicates that on 
average it was more relevant in Spain than in Portugal, growing at an average annual rate of 0.51 
and 0.24 percent, respectively.  Moreover, the results also suggest that Franco was more 
successful than Salazar in capitalizing the economy.  During the early years of democracy, 
Portugal recovered some ground but fell short again during the 1986-1993 period.  Given that 
both countries received significant structural funds from the European Community in the latter 
period, it seems that the Spanish were able to implement those projects more efficiently.  
However, in recent years the contribution of capital toward output per capita has been higher in 
Portugal than in Spain. 
Table 1.B summarizes the results for a 10 percent depreciation rate under the same linear 
motion of capital formulation.  The higher depreciation rate reduces the capital contributions to 
per capita output, and actually makes its average negative in Portugal for the overall period.   
 
Table 1.B  Growth Accounting (δ = 10%; linear investment function) 
Country Time Period %∆(Y/N) Due to TFP Due to K/Y Due to L/N 
Portugal 1950-1959 4.11 7.32 -2.16 -1.05 
 1960-1973 7.01 6.89 -0.09 0.21 
 1974-1985 1.53 1.45 0.63 -0.55 
 1986-1993 2.51 1.18 0.30 1.03 
 1994-2004 2.02 0.34 0.92 0.76 
      
 1950-2004 3.95 3.88 -0.09 0.16 
      
Spain 1950-1959 4.16 5.42 -0.51 -0.75 
 1960-1974 5.65 5.14 0.46 0.04 
 1975-1985 1.58 3.74 0.32 -2.48 
 1986-1993 2.09 1.36 0.47 0.26 
 1994-2004 2.28 -0.40 0.15 2.53 
      
 1950-2004 3.61 3.62 0.17 -0.18 
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With the smaller capital contributions, TFP becomes larger in both countries and remains 
the key driver of growth.  Specifically, under the 10 percent depreciation rate assumption, the 
average annual growth rate of capital-output ratio over the entire period was 0.17 percent in 
Spain and -0.09 in Portugal.  On the other hand, the annual average contribution of TFP 
increased to 3.88 percent in Portugal and 3.62 in Spain. 
A comparison of Table 1.A with Table 1.B suggests that capital stock was, on average, a 
drag on the Portuguese growth experience, whereas for the Spanish it only had an inhibiting 
effect during the 1950-1960 period. 
The correlation of each accounting measure with the overall average annual growth rate 
in output per capita is provided in Table 1.C. 
 
Table 1.C  Correlations with Linear Capital Accumulation 
 Y/N 
 05.0 =δ  10.0 =δ  
 Portugal Spain Portugal Spain 
TFP 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
K/Y 0.83 0.95 0.32 0.87 
L/N 0.80 -0.68 0.80 -0.68 
 
One of the key premises for using statistical correlations is that the there must be a linear 
relationship among the variables.  Given that the growth accounting exercise is based on 
equation (1.2), which assumes a linear relationship between output per capita, TFP, capital-
output ratio, and the employment rate, then it is reasonable to employ this statistical tool to 
speculate about potential correlations.  Table 1.C shows that changes in the depreciation rate do 
not alter the potential degree of correlation between TFP and the employment rate with output 
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per capita in both countries.  Moreover, it supports the conjuncture that TFP is the variable most 
closely related to the path of output per capita and that throughout the 55-year period, the 
Spanish employment rate had, on average, a negative relationship with the latter.  On the other 
hand, Table 1.C also indicates that higher depreciation rates make the capital-output ratio evolve 
less closely to output per capita. 
Among the results shown in Table 1.C it is interesting that the employment rate in 
Portugal has a positive relationship with output per capita whereas in Spain this relationship is 
negative.  The opposite correlation signs are in line with the discussion previously presented 
about the discrepancies between the Portuguese and the Spanish labor markets. For example, the 
statistical results are consistent with Blanchard’s (1995, p.216-7) argument that the relatively 
higher unemployment benefits in Spain could explain the persistence of higher unemployment 
rates. 
 
1.5.3. Growth Accounting Results with Exponential Capital Accumulation 
To test the consistency of the growth accounting results, two additional simulations were 
performed.  These are based on the assumption that the formulation for the motion of capital, i.e. 
δδ
ttkt IKAK
−
+ =
1
1 , incorporates an adjustment cost which motivates the representative agent to 
prefer smoother investment patterns.  Table 1.D presents the growth accounting estimates 
computed using equation (1.2) and assuming the exponential capital accumulation process with a 
5 percent depreciation rate. 
In the table below we observe that a smoother investment pattern would inflate the 
estimated contribution of capital toward the growth rate of output per capita in both countries.  In 
turn, this increase would be offset by a diminished relevance of TFP, which now would account 
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for approximately 52 percent of overall average annual growth rate of output per capita in 
Portugal and 49 percent in Spain.  Another interesting observation under this scenario is that the 
capital-output ratio became the main driver of growth in each regime interval, except during the 
golden years.   
 
Table 1.D  Growth Accounting (δ = 5%; exponential capital accumulation) 
Country Time Period %∆(Y/N) Due to TFP Due to K/Y Due to L/N 
Portugal 1950-1959 4.11 2.44 2.72 -1.05 
 1960-1973 7.01 5.42 1.38 0.21 
 1974-1985 1.53 0.09 1.99 -0.55 
 1986-1993 2.51 0.65 0.83 1.03 
 1994-2004 2.02 -0.01 1.27 0.76 
      
 1950-2004 3.95 2.05 1.74 0.16 
      
Spain 1950-1959 4.16 1.45 3.45 -0.75 
 1960-1974 5.65 3.72 1.89 0.04 
 1975-1985 1.58 1.81 2.25 -2.48 
 1986-1993 2.09 0.66 1.17 0.26 
 1994-2004 2.28 -0.90 0.65 2.53 
      
 1950-2004 3.61 1.78 2.01 -0.18 
 
In terms of hierarchical relevance for the overall 55-year period, the conclusions are 
similar to those advocated for the linear capital accumulation scenario with a 5 percent 
depreciation rate in the case of Portugal. In particular, TFP was the main engine of growth, 
followed by capital and labor, respectively. However, in the case of Spain there is a significant 
change associated with the assumption of an adjustment cost in the motion of capital.  The latter 
implies that, on average, capital became the main engine of growth during the 1950-2004 period 
whereas under the assumption of a linear motion of capital this role belonged to TFP.  However, 
if the true depreciation rate would be 10 percent instead (Table 1.E), then TFP would be again, 
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on average, the main engine of growth in both Iberian countries regardless of the capital 
accumulation assumptions. 
 
Table 1.E  Growth Accounting (δ = 10%; exponential investment function) 
Country Time Period %∆(Y/N) Due to TFP Due to K/Y Due to L/N 
Portugal 1950-1959 4.11 6.42 -1.26 -1.05 
 1960-1973 7.01 6.92 -0.12 0.21 
 1974-1985 1.53 1.22 0.86 -0.55 
 1986-1993 2.51 1.18 0.30 1.03 
 1994-2004 2.02 0.33 0.93 0.76 
      
 1950-2004 3.95 3.66 0.13 0.16 
      
Spain 1950-1959 4.16 4.71 0.20 -0.75 
 1960-1974 5.65 5.21 0.40 0.04 
 1975-1985 1.58 3.30 0.76 -2.48 
 1986-1993 2.09 1.35 0.48 0.26 
 1994-2004 2.28 -0.41 0.16 2.53 
      
 1950-2004 3.61 3.39 0.40 -0.18 
 
The results delineated above suggest that the estimates for the capital-output contribution 
in Table 1.F might be outliers.  In fact, Figure 1.F supports this conjuncture given that the levels 
of capital-output ratios are relatively much higher when a 5 percent depreciation rate is imposed 
on the exponential capital accumulation process.  Moreover, the actual data for the levels of 
investment per capita (Figure 1.C) reveal a certain degree of volatility that is buffered by the 
adjustment cost in the exponential capital accumulation process.  Consequently, the resulting 
smoothness in investment preferences creates a compounding effect on the capital-output levels 
that is not sufficiently offset by a 5 percent depreciation rate.  Nonetheless, when assuming a 10 
percent depreciation rate the compounding effect is neutralized by the rapid capital deterioration 
and the estimates become more consistent with those of the linear capital accumulation scenarios 
in terms of hierarchical contributions (and levels), i.e. on average, throughout the 1950-2004 
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period, TFP was the main engine of growth in both countries whereas capital was relatively more 
important in Spain than in Portugal, and vice-versa for the labor contribution.  
The linear growth accounting relationships, implied by equation (1.2) and the adjustment 
cost assumption in the capital accumulation process, are summarized in Table 1.F.  
 
Table 1.F  Correlations with Exponential Capital Accumulation 
 Y/N 
 05.0 =δ  10.0 =δ  
 Portugal Spain Portugal Spain 
TFP 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.97 
K/Y 0.98 0.99 0.71 0.94 
L/N 0.80 -0.68 0.80 -0.68 
 
As expected, the preferences for a smoother investment pattern makes the capital-output 
series more closely related to the output per capita series when compared to those correlations 
obtained for the scenarios with a linear accumulation process (Table 1. C).  Another consequence 
of these inflated correlations is that under a 5 percent depreciation rate, the capital-output ratio 
becomes somewhat more correlated to output per capita than TFP, but overall, the insights 
provided by the correlation summary are the same as those drawn when capital was assumed to 
accumulated in a linear fashion. 
In summary, the four growth accounting simulations suggest convergence in the output 
per capita levels between Portugal and Spain over the 1950-2004 period and that growth in the 
Iberian Peninsula was particularly faster before the democratization process.  On average, TFP 
was the main engine of growth for both countries across all scenarios, except in Spain when we 
assumed the exponential motion of capital with a 5 percent depreciation rate.  Despite the 
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potential tradeoff in leading roles between TFP and capital, the latter was more relevant in the 
Spanish than in the Portuguese growth experience over the last 55 years.   
A consistent result across all simulations concerns the relative role of capital and labor in 
the Portuguese and Spanish performance after the adhesion to the European Single Market.  In 
recent years, Spain has been able to grow relatively faster mainly due to the increasing 
contribution of labor.  Conversely, in Portugal, the contribution of the capital-output ratio 
became more relevant than labor over the same period.  This is particularly interesting given that 
on average, labor was more relevant than capital in the Portuguese growth experience over the 
entire 1950-2004 period. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
This essay investigates the Iberian growth and development experiences during the 1950-
2004 period based on a detailed assessment of the political and socioeconomic experiences, the 
performance of macroeconomic indicators, and contributes to the literature because it provides 
growth accounting estimates for four different capital construction scenarios in Portugal and 
Spain.  The empirical results support the argument that, in general, TFP was the main driver of 
growth for the Iberian economies during the 55 years of interest. 
Besides sharing the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal and Spain engaged in similar social, 
political, and economic experiences during the post-WWII period.15  However, even today, 
Spain’s output per capita is significantly higher than Portugal, and the latter remains among the 
                                                 
15 The exceptions are, for example, the different international trade policies during the 1960s. 
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poorest countries in Europe despite growing somewhat faster than Spain.  Nonetheless, the speed 
of convergence was not fast enough to offset the gap in output per capita levels.   
The Spanish ability to ameliorate its relative economic status in recent years might be due 
to the skillful management of political and socioeconomic challenges, such as the 
democratization and adhesion to the European Single Market.  The future does not appear to be 
any brighter for Portugal given the historical relevance of labor contributions toward output per 
capita growth and the current scarcity of skilled labor, which might constrain the adoption of 
new technologies. 
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ESSAY 2 - Iberian Barriers to Technological Adoption 
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2.1. Introduction 
Based on the growth accounting exercise performed in the previous essay, Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) has been the main engine of growth for the Iberian economies during the 
1950-2004 period.  Consequently, to have a more detailed understanding of the Iberian growth 
experiences it is important to assess which factors may have played a role facilitating TFP 
augmentation and how these differed between Portugal and Spain.  The first challenge in the task 
at hand is to define which factors may foster TFP growth.  In the standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function, αα −= 1tttt LKAY , there are just four variables determining output at any 
period in time, t, namely, the amount of labor employed, tL , the units of capital used, tK , the 
marginal contribution of each factor input (α for capital), and the scalar, tA , which captures 
everything else that influences output production and that economists typically refer to as TFP or 
the Solow residual, in honor of the seminal contribution that Robert Solow (1956) made to 
economic growth theory.  In fact, even today, Solow’s model remains the baseline framework 
from which new theories can be extended and compared. 
One recent growth theory that builds on the Solow model has been presented by Parente 
and Prescott (1994, 2000, 2005).  Their theory suggests that countries may reach differing steady 
states because of barriers to technological adoption - i.e. those factors that inhibit TFP growth - 
given that the higher the barriers, the greater the investment required to implement new 
technologies.  According to Parente and Prescott (2000), these barriers to technology adoption 
may take a variety of forms such as regulatory and legal constraints, bribes that must be paid, 
violence or threat of violence, outright sabotage, and worker strikes.  
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The barriers theory of Parente and Prescott has led to a number of important follow up 
studies which confirm the existence of barriers in a number of different settings.  Boucekkine 
and Martinez (1999) introduced barriers to technology adoption in a canonical vintage capital 
model.16  Hall and Jones (1999) redefined barriers to technology adoption as social infrastructure 
and found that good infrastructure encourages “the adoption of new ideas and new technologies 
as they are invented throughout the world.”17  Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) advocated that 
income disparities between LDCs and DCs arise even in the absence of policy induced barriers 
to technology adoption due to differences in labor force skills.18  Ngai (2004) argued that 
international income disparities were related to different levels of barriers to technology adoption 
and capital accumulation, and that the latter delay the turning point between growth stages.19  
Harding and Rattsø (2005) investigated the role of barriers to technology adoption on South 
Africa’s growth.20  And, Comin and Hobijn (2007) set up a tractable model of endogenous 
growth in which the returns to innovation are determined by the technology adoption decisions.21 
 
                                                 
16 Using numerical methods, the author validated the dynamics of the model and found that higher adoption 
costs constrain output levels in the long run, augment short run fluctuations, and decrease the convergence speed to 
steady state. 
17 Quantitative analysis of data for 127 countries suggested that differences in social infrastructure led to 
large disparities in income across countries. 
18 Using 1997 U. N. General Industrial Statistics data for 22 countries, the authors conclude that technology 
adoption also depends on supplies of factors of production, since different technologies fit better different factors of 
production. 
19 Ngai’s findings were based on the development experiences of the 124 countries from Maddison's 2001 
dataset. 
20 The authors concluded that reduced barriers pre- and post- sanctions and the high barrier during sanctions 
explained the development of productivity. 
21 Calibrating it to U.S. data, the authors found that policies inducing lower barriers increase growth. 
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This essay contributes to the above growing body of work.  In particular, it adopts the 
Parente and Prescott (2000) growth theory to estimate the level of barriers to technological 
adoption in Spain and Portugal and provides corroborating evidence for disparities between these 
values. 
The key difference between the Solow model (1956) and the Parente and Prescott (2000) 
framework is the inclusion of a technological capital stock.  Here, we build on the Parente and 
Prescott (2000) structure by modifying the model to include adjustment costs in capital 
investment.  This addition results in a model in which closed form solutions can be computed.  
More importantly, it results in an improved simulation structure where no attention to negative 
investment levels is needed.  Next, this model is applied to post World War II development 
experiences in Spain and Portugal and shown that it is able to explain these experiences well. 
Finally, a value for the level of barriers in the Iberian economies is proposed. 
The text is organized as follows. In section 2.2, the model is described and the closed 
form rules for the competitive economy are presented.  Section 2.3 applies a Parente and Prescott 
type routine to calibrate the model using U.S. and Japanese data.  Section 2.4 reviews the Iberian 
political and socioeconomic experiences during the post World War II period and assesses its fit 
to the results of our numerical experiments, and the implied levels of barriers to technological 
adoption are supported by the corroborating view of others.  Section 2.5 concludes. 
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2.2. Modelling Barriers to Technological Adoption 
The model presented in this section builds on the framework of Parente and Prescott 
(2000) and most of their structure and notation is preserved. 22  The main difference is the 
formulation for the motion of both physical and technological capital.  Here, the capital 
accumulation process incorporates and adjustment cost component, similar to Lucas and Prescott 
(1971), which enables closed form solutions for the social planning problem, hence making the 
model analytically tractable.  In addition to making the simulations much easier, the adjustment 
cost component also implies that there is a preference for smoother investment patterns and this 
fact eliminates the concern over negative investment values that is present in the various Parente 
and Prescott models.  
 
2.2.1. The Corporate Sector 
Here, everything is envisioned on a per worker basis. A firm that operates th  hours per 
workweek, uses tk units of physical capital per worker and tz  units of intangible capital per 
worker, has a level of output per worker given by 
zk
tttt zkhAy
θθπµ )(= , (2.1) 
where  )1()1( zk θθγµ −−+= is related to the exogenous rate of growth for world knowledge, γ , and 
is assumed to be greater than zero.  In addition, TFP is assumed to be governed by 
                                                 
22 The 1994 version of Parente and Prescott model includes the government sector and a somewhat 
different modelling technique for the barriers to technological adoption. The version adopted here does not 
contemplate an explicit role for the government. 
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zA θππ −+= )1()( where π  is a measure of the barriers to technology adoption in a given country 
and higher values of π  are interpreted to correspond to countries where the barriers to 
technology adoption are higher.  Output elasticity parameters kθ  and zθ  are assumed to be 
positive and 1<+ zk θθ .  It is noteworthy that our production function may suggest that it has 
increasing returns to scale because the sum of the exponents adds up to more than 1, however 
this is not the case as this is a per worker production function.  Hence, additional workers are 
handled simply through replication of this production function and therefore the aggregate 
production function exhibits constant returns to scale. 
Firms are assumed to hire labor and rent physical capital through competitive markets but 
to invest in intangible capital on their own.  Investment in intangible capital in the amount zti is 
combined with the existing intangible capital stock tz  and leads to future intangible capital 
stocks given by 
zz
ttzt izAz
δδπ −+ =
1
1 )( , 
(2.2) 
where zA<0 and 10 << zδ .  This formulation in exponential form imposes an adjustment cost 
element as in Lucas and Prescott (1971). 
The choices of firms are governed by a desire to maximize the value of the dividend 
stream paid to its owners.  The firm’s dividends are simply revenues minus expenses and are 
given by 
zttkttttft ikrhwyv −−−= , (2.3) 
where )( tt hw  is the wage rate per worker at time t and is a function of the number of hours the 
firm is in operation, ktr  is the rental rate on physical capital at time t and zti  is the number of 
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units of intangible capital that the firm invests in at time t.  The labor and capital markets are 
assumed to be competitive, which implies wage and rental rates given by 
t
t
zkt
h
y
w )1( θθ −−= , 
(2.4) 
t
t
kkt
k
y
r θ= , 
(2.5) 
t
t
zzt
z
y
r θ= , 
(2.6) 
where ztr  is the implicit rental rate on technological capital.  The firms behave in the best interest 
of their stockholders and thus their optimization problem is to maximize 
∑
∞
=
=
0
0 )(
t
fttvpzv , 
subject to (2.1), (2.2.) and (2.3) where tp  is the price of output at date t.   
 
2.2.2. The Consumer Sector 
The consumer sector consists of a large number of identical agents who own equal initial 
shares of the two marketable assets in the economy.  These marketable assets consist of physical 
capital, denoted tk  for holdings at date t, and ownership rights to one firm.
23  In addition, each 
household has one unit of time at each date which is allocated between labor supply and leisure 
consumption.  Households have preferences for consumption and leisure over time given by 
( )∑
∞
=
+−
0
)1(ln
t
t
t
t
t hBc ηγβ , 
(2.7) 
                                                 
23 Technology capital is invested in by firms and is not traded in a market. 
 49 
where 10 << β , B<0  and η<0 .  In this set up, tc  denotes consumption of goods at date t. 
The term t)1( γ+  is present in the utility function in order to keep the labor supply th  stationary 
over time.  Without this element, as tc  grows, the labor supply would be driven to a boundary.  
This term can be interpreted as implying that the value of time in home production increases over 
time at a rate equal to the balanced growth rate for the economy.   
The household physical capital stock changes over time when new investment kti  is 
combined with the existing capital stock tk  according to 
kk
ttkt ikAk
δδπ −+ =
1
1 )( , 
(2.8) 
where kA<0 and 10 << kδ .  As in the technological capital, this formulation is motivated by 
Lucas and Prescott (1971). 
Then we can formulate the representative agent's objective as maximizing (2.7) subject to 
(2.8) and the budget constraint 
fttktttktt vkrhwic ++=+ . (2.9) 
Moreover, because households are assumed to be numerous, each household is a 
sufficiently small part of the economy so that they are price takers. 
 
2.2.3. Competitive Equilibrium 
The competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of prices { }0:,, ≥twrp tktt  and 
allocations { }0:,,,,,,,,, 1100 ≥++ tzkviihcyzk ttftztktttt , such that: 
1. Agents optimize: 
i. Given { }0:,, ≥tvwr fttkt  and 0k , the allocations { }0:,,, 1 ≥+ tkihc tkttt  solve the 
consumer’s optimization problem. 
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ii. Given { }0:,, ≥twrp tktt  and 0z , the allocations { }0:,,,,, 1 ≥+ tzivkhy tztftttt  solve the 
firm’s optimization problem. 
2. Markets clear: 
i. Goods market: zttktt iyic −=+ , for t=0,1,... 
ii. Labor market: tt hh = , for t=0,1,...  
ii. Physical capital market: tt kk = , for t=0,1,...  
 
2.2.4. Decision Rules 
Although it is numerically feasible to solve for the competitive equilibrium using the 
expressions implicit in its definition, it is much easier to work with the social planning decision 
rules.  The social planner is simply an integrated consumer-producer that makes all consumption, 
investment and production decisions simultaneously.  The planner takes as its objective the 
consumer utility function and maximizes this subject to all the consumer and producer 
constraints described above.  In the appendix, the formal specification of the social planning 
problem is given and solved.  The decision rules that solve this problem are given by: 
tkkt yai =  where 
)1(1 k
kk
ka δβ
θβδ
−−
= , 
tzzt yai =  where 
)1(1 z
zz
za δβ
θβδ
−−
= , 
tzkt yaac )1( −−= , 
and 
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2.3. Calibration 
The model is calibrated similarly to Parente and Prescott (1994, 2000).  The routine 
begins by setting the barrier parameter π equal to zero to correspond to the U.S. economy 
baseline.  Then values for most parameters are assigned based on observations of the U.S. 
economy.  For those parameters corresponding to variables for which there are no data, values 
are determined based on convergence information between U.S. and Japan during the post World 
War II period. Finally, as in Parente and Prescott (2000), the principle of common technology 
across countries is adopted, hence all model parameters except π are the same in the U.S., Spain 
and Portugal.24 
The parameter γ  is set to 0.02 to correspond to the observed 2 percent annual growth rate 
of per capita output and β  is set to 0.9716 to correspond to a 5 percent risk free interest rate.25  
Next, η is set to 10.00 to correspond to a labor supply elasticity of 0.11.26  Given these 
parameters, the remaining parameters were jointly calibrated to match other statistics.  Table 2.A 
                                                 
24 As the authors explained on p.67, without this principle there would be no discipline to the analysis. 
Moreover, they demonstrated that this should not raise any controversy as barriers at the plant level lead to 
differences in TFP at the aggregate level. 
25 The risk free interest rate r is defined by introducing privately issued real bonds into the household 
budget constraint.  These bonds have a zero net supply, and in balance growth the first order condition for bonds 
implies 1)lnexp( −−= βγr  
26 This elasticity value is relatively low and corresponds to most empirical estimates of the male supply 
elasticity.  Such a value seemed more appropriate for our purposes where the focus is on long run outcomes rather 
than business cycle outcomes.  With more elastic labor supply calibrations, the model will imply bigger changes in 
labor hours in transitional economies. 
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indicates the outcome of the calibration procedure along with the other statistics which were 
matched.27 
 
Table 2.A  Calibrated Values 
Parameter Value Empirical Fact to Match 
π 0 Normalized for U.S. baseline 
zθ  0.30 Rate of convergence matches Japan 
kθ  0.20 Rate of convergence matches Japan 
γ  0.02 Growth rate for per capita GDP is 2% 
zA  1.585 Implied by the output production function 
zδ  0.0974 Average tzt yi /  ratio 0.30 
kA  1.305 Average tt yk /  ratio 2.5 
kδ  0.0974 Average tkt yi /  ratio 0.20 
β  0.9716 After tax interest rate of 5% 
B 620 Fraction of time devoted to labor of 0.4 
η  10.00 Labor supply elasticity 11.0)1( 1 =− −γ  
 
Most of the calibrated parameters are consistent with those found in Parente and Prescott 
(2000).  Nonetheless, there are some differences.  In this essay kθ is equal to 0.20 whereas their 
value was 0.16.  This discrepancy does not require much attention since 0.20 is closer to the 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function estimates of 0.3 to 0.4.  For zθ , the calibration 
routine estimated a value of 0.3 which is quite a bit smaller than Parente and Prescott's value of 
0.55.  This reflects differences in the capital accumulation modeling structures.  Since the model 
                                                 
27 Most of these calibration statistics come from Parente and Prescott (2002).  The growth rate for per 
capita GDP in the U.S of 2%, the tt yk /  ratio of 2.5, the tkt yi /  ratio of 0.20, the after tax interest rate of 5% and 
the fraction of time devoted to labor of 0.4 come from page 75, while the average tzt yi /  ratio of 0.30 is within the 
range defined on page 76. 
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in this essay has an adjustment cost technology built into the capital accumulation formulations 
for the two capital stocks, the rate of convergence is dampened because the adjustment cost 
formulation induces slower investment patterns.  As discussed in Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
(1995), the rate of convergence is also related to the sum of kθ  and zθ , with higher values for 
this sum implying slower convergence.  Since the adjustment cost formulation already induces 
slower convergence, the sum of kθ  and zθ  cannot be as large as in Parente and Prescott or 
convergence rates would not match those observed between the U.S. and Japan. 
 
2.4. Iberian Development Experiences 
This section investigates the postwar development experiences of Spain and Portugal in 
order to provide insight into turning points in which the barriers to technology adoption changed 
in each of these countries.  With this history in mind, we then turn to the evaluation of each 
economy.  Finally, a review of some recently collected data is presented and reconciled with the 
suggested levels of barriers in Portugal and Spain.  
 
2.4.1. Background 
Even though geographic proximity is really not enough to imply similar economic 
outcomes, the Portuguese and Spanish development experiences have been quite alike.28  
Probably most important to the similar economic paths is the long shared history of the two 
countries and the brotherly rapport they have with each other.  These countries seem to routinely 
do what the other does.  So both spent most of the 20th century under a dictatorship, had their 
                                                 
28 Obvious counter examples abound such as the U.S. and Mexico. 
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golden years in the post World War II period, became democratic in the mid 1970s, joined the 
European Community in 1986, the European Single Market and European Union in 1993, and 
were among the 12 European countries that adopted the Euro currency in 2000. 
In Figure 1, output per worker in Portugal and Spain relative to the U.S. over the postwar 
period is plotted based on data from Maddison (2007).  It shows striking similarities between the 
Iberian economies.  This recent economic history played out as follows. 
 
Figure 2.A  GDP per capita relative to U.S. level 
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Between World War II and the OPEC-induced international energy crisis in 1973, the 
Spanish economy experienced an unprecedented period of growth boosted by the massive and 
profound transformation of the industrial sector.  Industrial productivity increased by 100 percent 
between 1964 and 1973. Consequently, Spain's industry became technologically sophisticated 
(Tortella, 2000). In contrast, Portugal focused more on the progressive opening of its economy to 
the world; the merchandise export growth rate between 1959 and 1973 was 11 percent per year 
whereas in industrialized countries it was 8.9 percent (Baklanoff, 1992). 
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Soon after the 1973 oil shock, both countries went through a period of social and 
economic turmoil. The military coup of April 1974 ousted the long-lived authoritarian regime of 
António de Oliveira Salazar (1932-1968) and Marcelo Caetano (1968-1974), whereas the 
Spanish dictatorship (1939-1975) ended with the death of Francisco Franco. In addition, both 
countries followed a negotiated model of transition to democracy where, according to Colomer 
(1991), pacts among political elites and consensus among citizenry sought to avoid acts of 
revenge, violent confrontations, and civil war. 
Along with democratization came changes in the economic system. The Portuguese 
revolutionaries nationalized commercial banks and most heavy and medium size industries in 
order to emasculate the old elite's economic base. Moreover, the dismemberment of the colonial 
empire resulted in the loss of a significant source of income (Baklanoff, 1992). Spain, on the 
other hand, experienced a smoother transition process skillfully managed by the new chief of 
state, King Juan Carlos I, who had lived in exile in Portugal till Franco's death.  During the early 
years of democracy, Spain focused on stop-gap economic measures such as the Moncloa Pacts, 
which assured a degree of moderation for increases in prices and salaries (Tortella, 2000). 
The turbulent road to stability culminated with the accession of the Iberian countries to 
the European Community in 1986. This step boosted economic growth in both countries mainly 
due to the inflow of structural funds, foreign direct investment, and gradual privatization of state 
monopolies along with deregulation of prices and markets. These economic “good times” proved 
short lived and ended in 1992-93 when most West European economies were caught in the midst 
of economic recessions and struggled to implement the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, 
which imposed serious constraints on fiscal and monetary policies. The criteria to adhere to the 
European Monetary Union included: “inflation over 12 months could not exceed by more than 
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1.5 percentage points the average rate among the three EC countries with the lowest inflation; 
long-term nominal interest rates over 12 months could not exceed by more than 2 percentage 
points the average for the same three countries; the currency had to remain in the narrow band 
of the exchange rate mechanism for at least two years without devaluation; the budget deficit 
should not exceed 3 percent of GDP; and total public debt could not exceed 60 percent of GDP” 
(Maxwell et al., 1994, p.51). 
The Maastricht rules may have reduced the public sector deficit, but the decline in public 
investment in physical capital and research and development inhibited economic growth in both 
countries. On the other hand, the adhesion to the European single market in 1993 (i.e. free 
movement of labor, capital, goods and services), may have aggravated the European Monetary 
System’s impact as it exposed domestic firms to increasing foreign competition. In fact, Gunther 
et al. (2004) advocate that these were the major causes for stagnation of Spanish productivity 
during the 1996-2001 period. Despite these deterrents, both countries experienced modest 
growth in the late 1990s, probably nourished by the continuing privatization of parastate 
industries and market deregulation. It is worth mentioning that Portugal was at the time one of 
the largest “privatizers” in the OECD, with revenues amounting to approximately 2.8, 4.7, 3.9, 
and 1.5 percent of GDP between 1996 and 1999 (Torres, 2000). 
Most recently, between 2000 and 2003, a series of international adverse shocks impacted 
the Iberian Economies. These events included, for example, the international stock market crash 
in March of 2000, and a gradual increase in oil prices along with worsening terms of trade. 
Relatively, Portugal ended up worse off probably due to its higher degree of openness. 
Based on this history, four regime changes were identified for the Iberian economies. 
First, in 1960, due to radical changes in industrial and foreign trade policies. Second, 1974 in 
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Portugal and 1975 in Spain, due to the social and economic turmoil and its repercussions. Third, 
in 1986 when European Community membership meant changes in domestic fiscal and monetary 
policies and massive inflows of structural funds. And fourth, in 1994, because of the European 
Single Market and EU entries and inherent domestic policy constraints. 
These regime changes are also identified by other authors. Lopes (2004a) defines the 
period 1960-1973 as the Portuguese golden years and Blakanoff (1992) concludes that the 1974 
Portuguese revolution marks the end of the exceptionally rapid economic growth and structural 
change initiated in 1960. Tortella (2000) indicates that 1960 was the beginning of an 
unprecedented growth period in Spain. Cheung and Chinn (1996), Fulvio (2001), and Escosura e 
Roses (2007), found that in 1975 there is a statistically significant break in the Spanish growth 
trend. Lopes (2004a) identifies the period 1986-94 as a complete business cycle for the 
Portuguese economy. Jimeno et al. (2006) point to 1986 has the year when there was a structural 
break in Spanish labor productivity growth, using a Sup-Wald test. Finally, Gunther et al. (2004) 
state that the Spanish economic expansion of the late 1980s came to an abrupt end by 1994 and 
was then followed by a strong recovery based on fiscal reform and influx of structural 
investment funds from the EU (2004). 
 
2.4.2. Spain 
Given the political and socioeconomic background, and the corroborating views of 
others, we now turn to assessing the postwar economic experiences in Spain and Portugal based 
on barriers to technology adoption during each regime outlined above.  We begin by focusing on 
the Spanish experience.  Using data from Maddison (2007), the 1945 Spanish output per worker 
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was 21.63 percent of the U.S. level.29  To initialize our model economy to this output level, the 
relative levels of physical and technological capitals were set at 15.66 and 11.76 percent, 
respectively. From this initial condition, the model was simulated several times in order to 
determined the levels of barriers that would allow the best fit to the observed based postwar 
Spanish experience.30  Table 2.B. displays the implied levels of barriers and Figure 2.B shows 
the model’s fit. 
 
Figure 2.B  Spain: Model’s Fit 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1945 1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001
Data
Model
 
 
Table 2.B  Level of Barriers in Spain 
 π ../ SUSpain yy  
1945-1959 2.3377 0.2878 
1960-1974 0.7741 0.4714 
1975-1985 1.1191 0.4909 
1986-1993 1.0731 0.5180 
1994-2003 0.7849 0.5772 
 
                                                 
29 As in Parente and Prescott (1994), both the Spanish, Portuguese and U.S. data were smoothed using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. We used a smoothing parameter of 100. 
30 Simulations were done using Gauss, version 8.0. 
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The simulation outcome is consistent with the observed economic path and the barriers 
show an expected pattern. After an initial high level of barriers, these decreased by 67.44 percent 
between 1960 and 1974. At this time, Spain was experiencing an average 7 percent growth in 
output per capita, and in particular, automobile production was increasing at an extraordinary 
pace of 22 percent per annum (Tortella, 2000). In fact, Tortella (2000) characterizes this period 
as the Spanish industrial revolution, and the automobile sector its leading source because it 
fostered the development of at least three additional industries: rubber production, iron and steel, 
and petroleum refining. In the mid 1970s, the social and economic turmoil linked to 
democratization decreased the ease of adopting new technologies and the barriers increased. 
Once the country stabilized and gained its EC membership in 1986, the barriers diminished 
slightly.  But it was not until the post Single European Market and EU enforcement that the 
barriers to technology adoption returned to a level similar to that recorded during the 1960s. 
 
2.4.3. Portugal 
Again, using data from Maddison (2007), Portugal's 1945 output per worker was 19.21 
percent of the U.S. level. Given the framework used in this essay, this is consistent with relative 
levels of physical and technological capitals of 13.11 and 11.10 percent, respectively. Next, 
using barrier parameters given in Table 3, the model was simulated.  Figure 3 compares the 
simulation results with the observed data for the Portuguese economy. 
Similar to the Spanish economy, Portugal had a high level of barriers to technology 
adoption immediately after WWII. This is not surprising since both dictatorships had 
protectionist policies in place and their industries were relatively uncompetitive. Changes in 
international trade policies associated with EFTA in 1960 and OECD entry in 1961, along with 
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the success of “Foment Plans”, radically transformed the Portuguese industry in the 1960s, 
leading to a 57.26 percent decrease in the barriers to technology adoption. The lower barriers 
associated with the 1960-73 period corroborate Parent and Prescott’s (1994) conjecture that 
greater trade openness weakens deterrents to technology adoption. Nonetheless, this is a 
relatively lower decrease in barriers than the one captured for Spain. The reason might lie on the 
sources of growth, as Portugal did not have very many spillovers like the ones generated by the 
Spanish automobile industry. 
 
 
Figure 2.C  Portugal: Model’s Fit 
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Table 2.C  Level of Barriers in Portugal 
 π ../ SUSpain yy  
1945-1959 3.0424 0.2537 
1960-1974 1.3002 0.3917 
1975-1985 1.4836 0.4294 
1986-1993 1.2523 0.4702 
1994-2003 1.3314 0.4876 
 
Alas, the golden years were over by 1973. The international oil crisis and the social and 
economic repercussions of the “Carnation Revolution” were shocks in the 1970s that decreased 
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firms’ ability to adopt new technologies. As in the Spanish economy, Portugal’s entrance in the 
European Community eventually lowered the barriers again. But, contrary to its neighbor, 
Portuguese barriers increased after 1994. The reason for this disparity might be due to the 
relatively lower ability of the Portuguese industry to adopt new technologies, given the scarcity 
of skilled workers. According to the World Development Indicators 2006, between 1993 and 
2003, only 10 percent of the Portuguese labor force had tertiary education whereas in Spain this 
share accounted for 24 percent. 
 
2.4.4. Recent Evidence of Barriers 
Recently a number of sources have begun collecting data which can be used to infer 
barrier levels.  Unfortunately, the data does not go back to 1945, so it is not possible to use it as a 
confirmation of the proposed barrier values over the entire interval.  However, it does provide a 
useful snapshot of recent barrier experiences.   
According to the World Bank Development Indicators database, in 2006 the percentage 
of managers surveyed that considered corruption as a major business constraint was 7.8 and 15.4 
percent in Portugal and Spain respectively.  This same survey found that the percentage of 
managers lacking confidence in courts to uphold property rights was 47.7 and 16.6 percent 
respectively and for overall court related issues that pose business constraints, 17.8 and 7.9 
percent.  This survey also found that crime was considered a barrier for 15.7 and 9.8 percent of 
the managers respectively. 
Another indicator of the barriers to adopt new technologies might be the time required to 
enforce a contract.  In Portugal the time is 320 days, while Spain is about half that at 169 days. In 
addition, the lower availability of R&D technicians in Portugal, 246 per million people on 
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average between 1996 and 2003 versus Spain with 607, might dissuade technology adoption 
(WDI, 2006). 
Worker strikes are another source that Parente and Prescott (1994) regard as a barrier to 
technology adoption.  Data published by the European Industrial Relations Observatory in 2000, 
2003 and 2005 indicates that Spain lost more working days than Portugal.  Between 1997 and 
2003, Spain lost an annual average of 176 days per 1000 employees whereas Portugal only 26 
days. This created an upward pressure on the Spanish barriers to technology adoption but not 
sufficiently enough to offset the comparative advantage on the other barriers that comprise the 
total level of barriers.31 
Finally, data published by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Reports is analyzed. In 
order to use these datasets, deterrents to entrepreneurship are loosely assumed as a proxy for 
barriers to technology adoption. In terms of access to venture capital, the Spanish perceived it to 
be better than the Portuguese, even though both considered it inadequate (De Castro et al., 2002). 
The survey averages were -0.94 for Spain and -1.10 for Portugal where very bad was coded -2.5, 
adequate was coded 0 and very good was coded 2.5. Another GEM measure of interest is the 
perceived adequacy of governmental programs in assisting new and growing firms. Again, 
Portugal scores lower than Spain, but the difference is rather small. However, both would be 
considered as slightly inadequate (Medina et al., 2001). On the other hand, when assessing the 
adequacy of governmental regulations the Spanish clearly perceived them better than the 
Portuguese, giving an average score of 0.42 and --0.82, respectively (De Castro et al., 2002). 
                                                 
31 It should also be noted that most of these lost days were related to "Accidents, health and safety", while 
Portuguese strikes were driven by "Pay" disputes, so to some extent this lopsided data may not be very reliable for 
indicating barriers. 
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Based on these recent sources, it is hard to argue that the level of barriers in the Iberian 
economies were largely different. However, they do mostly indicate that they are somewhat 
higher in Portugal than in Spain.  More importantly, they indicate that both countries still need to 
reduce their barriers. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
A new growth theory presented by Parente and Prescott (1994, 2000, 2005) suggests that 
countries may converge to different steady states due to barriers to technological adoption. This 
paper contributes to the existing literature because it applied this new theory to assess the 
Spanish and Portuguese development experiences in the post World War II period.  Moreover, in 
order to get a model with closed form solutions a new formulation for the capital investment 
functions that accounted for an adjustment cost was imposed, as advocated by Lucas and 
Prescott (1971).  This innovation on the Parente and Prescott's model resulted in an improved 
simulation exercise because it eliminated the concern about negative investment values. 
 The numerical experiments indicated that the barriers levels have been persistently 
higher in Portugal than in Spain. More importantly, the barriers levels of these countries have 
been positively correlated till 1993, when both joined the European Single Market.  Afterwards, 
the barriers evolved in opposite directions, augmenting the disparity in output per worker among 
the Iberian economies.  Finally, evidence was shown to corroborate the conjuncture that at least 
in recent years the barriers levels were higher in Portugal than in Spain. 
We suggest that future research on the Iberian barriers should comprise an econometric 
study aimed at providing statistical evidence for the proposed levels of barriers and identifying 
the key deterrents in the process of adopting new technologies.  Such work could provide 
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additional elements to the growing body of work and ultimately support the elaboration of policy 
recommendations based on this barriers theory of economic growth. At this point, and to our 
knowledge, data availability remains the primary constrain for such work.  
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ESSAY 3 - Effective Tax Rates on Capital and Labor Income in the 
Post-dictatorship Iberian Economies  
 66 
3.1. Introduction 
We now turn to the analysis of fiscal policy in the Iberian growth and development 
experiences.  Even though TFP has been the key engine of growth during the 1950-2004 period, 
changes in capital-output ratios and the employment rates cannot be neglected since changes in 
these ratios contributed to output’s volatility.  This essay investigates whether distortionary taxes 
on capital and labor income may have been a key factor behind the observed volatility on the 
path of factor inputs during the post-dictatorship era. 
In Spain, the employment rate initiated a steep decline once the democratization process 
was initiated in 1975, only to stop upon adhesion to the European Community by 1986.  
Conversely, a dramatic increase occurred after joining the European Single Market in 1993.  The 
Portuguese labor path was less turbulent, but despite the upward trend during the 1975-2004 
period, it has also experienced several spikes.  The capital input time path has been more stable 
in the Iberian countries with it showing an upward trend during the thirty years following the fall 
of the dictatorships, but nonetheless, both observed some cyclical spikes.  One question we 
address here is: were the Iberian paths of factor inputs coincidental with changes in fiscal policy? 
To have a better understanding of the Iberian tax policies and their relationship with the 
levels of factor inputs, it is important to go beyond the analysis of statutory taxes as these often 
provide insufficient insight about the rates actually paid.  In this paper the analysis is focused on 
effective tax rates because those are the ones relevant for decisions related to productive 
activities, such as working and investing (Devereux, 2004). 
In order to estimate the effective rates on labor and capital income, we use the workhorse 
of modern macroeconomics and adopt the methodology employed by Bergoing et al. (2002) to 
study the impact of tax reforms on the economic performance of Mexico and Chile during the 
 67 
1980s.  Despite the availability of several other frameworks to assess effective tax rates, the 
results inferred under different methods tend to be highly correlated overtime, though 
significantly different in terms of estimated levels (De Hann et al., 2004).32  Consequently, 
because the primary goal of this essay is to assess the potential relationship between fiscal policy 
(i.e. contractionary or expansionary) and the path of factor inputs, it is expected that other 
methods would lead to largely the same conclusions as the Begoing et al. (2002) approach used 
here. 
The results presented in this essay corroborate the view that fiscal policy might have 
impacted the path of labor and capital in the Iberian economies. In addition, this study 
contributes to the existing literature by providing a set of estimated time series for effective tax 
rates on factor inputs in Spain and Portugal during the 1975-2004 period.  However, the main 
contribution is the estimated changes in average effective tax rates on capital and labor income 
under several scenarios and the evidence that these are consistent with the changes in fiscal 
policy asserted in the literature. 
The text is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 introduces a Bergoing et al. (2002) type 
model with capital income taxes, the model is then calibrated and preliminary results for 
effective tax series on capital income are provided.  The assessment of the results shows that this 
model is unable to capture the path of labor.  Section 1.3 extends the model by adding a tax on 
labor income.  Analysis of these results continues to show that the model does not fit very well.  
To remedy this, a model in which tax rates frequently change is investigated and the fit with the 
actual data is improved.  In Section 1.4, the results of this latter model are connected to the 
                                                 
32 For other frameworks used to assess effective tax rates see Hall and Jorgenson (1967), King (1974); King 
and Fullerton (1984), Devereux (1987, 1989, 2003), Alworth (1988), Keen (1991), Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar 
(1994), and McKenzie, Mintz and Scharf (1997). 
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political and socioeconomic history and data on statutory taxes to investigate plausibility.  The 
literature corroborates the estimated fluctuations in effective tax rates but the estimated levels are 
not fully supported.  Section 3.5. concludes. 
 
3.2. Model with only Capital Income Taxes 
In this section we use a framework that Bergoing et al. (2002) suggested to assess the 
role of capital income taxes in Mexico and Chile during the 1980s.  Our version of the model 
features a representative agent that has perfect foresight over the sequence of TFP shocks and 
chooses the optimal allocations of consumption, tC , leisure, tt LN − , and investment, tI ,  in 
order to maximize the following utility function 
( ) ( ){ }∑
∞
=
−−+
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ln1ln
t
ttt
t LNC γγβ , 
 
(3.1) 
subject to a budget constraint given by 
ttt
k
tttttt TKrLwKKC +−−+=−+ + ))(1(1 δτ , (3.2) 
an initial capital endowment, 1975K , and non-negativity constraints on consumption, denoted by 
tC .  The parameters are constrained so that 0<β<1, 0<γ<1, and 0< δ <1 where β stands for the 
discount factor, γ represents relative preferences for consumption and leisure, and δ is the 
depreciation rate.  In this setup we have denoted the total number of hours available for work and 
leisure by tN and used tL  to denote the actual number of hours worked.  In the budget constraint, 
tK  denotes capital at time t, 
k
tτ  is the effective tax rate on capital, tw  is the wage rate, tr  is the 
rental rate, and tT  is a lump-sum transfer.  It is assumed that the government refunds all tax 
collections, hence 
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Firms hire labor and rent physical capital through competitive markets and have a 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale, αα −= 1tttt LKAY , where 
tY  is total output, tA is total factor productivity (TFP), and α is the output elasticity with respect 
to the capital stock.  Competitive markets for capital and labor imply that wages and rental rates 
equal their marginal products and are given by 
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(3.5) 
Substituting (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) into (3.2) implies that in equilibrium the feasibility constraint 
simplifies to  
αα −=+ 1ttttt LKAIC , (3.6) 
where tttt KKI )1(1 δ−−= +  and denotes investment spending at time t. 
Based on the above, given 1975K , tA  and tN , the competitive equilibrium consists of 
prices { }0:, ≥twr tt , fiscal policy { }0:, ≥tTt tkt , and allocations { }0:,,,,1 ≥+ tICYLK ttttt , such 
that: 
1. Agents optimize: 
i. Given { }0:,,,, ≥tNTtwr ttkttt  and 1975K , the allocations { }0:,,,1 ≥+ tICLK tttt  
solve the consumer's optimization problem. 
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ii. Given { }0:,, ≥tAwr ttt , the allocations { }0:,, ≥tYLK ttt  solve the firms's 
optimization problem. 
2. Markets clear: 
i. Goods market: ttt YIC =+ , for t = 0,1,... 
ii. Labor market: tt LL = , for t = 0,1,...  
iii. Capital market: tt KK = , for t = 0,1,...  
3. The government budget constraint holds:  
tt
k
tt KrT )( δτ −= , for t = 0,1,... 
The competitive equilibrium in this case can be computed simply by solving the 
feasibility condition (3.2) for tC  and replacing it in the utility function (3.1) to get 
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and then taking the first order conditions with respect to labor and capital to get 
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Note that the capital income tax shows up in one of the optimality conditions for the 
representative agent, hence it has a distortionary effect because it alters the margins that 
                                                 
33 Technically the capital derivative corresponds to the derivative with respect to tK , but because first 
order conditions hold at all dates, we can write it as given here. 
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determine capital decisions.  This implies that fiscal policy may change the allocations of factor 
inputs and thus aggregate output. 
 
3.2.1. Calibration 
In order to conduct numerical simulations the model is calibrated analogously to 
Bergoing et al. (2002).  The discount factor, β, is set equal to 0.98 and the depreciation rate, δ , is 
set equal to 5 percent for both countries.  The output elasticity parameter α was set at 0.3. These 
are values widely used in macroeconomic analysis.  Simulations are based on data for tt CY , , and 
tI  during the 1950-2004 period which were collected from the Penn World Table (2006).
34  
Because the focus is on short run fluctuations, these data were detrended using a common 2% 
growth rate.  To obtain a capital series the expression tttt IKK −−=+ )1( 1 δ  was used starting 
from a 1950K  value obtained from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) for Spain and Portugal, 
respectively.  Data on tN  and tL  were collected from the Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre’s Total Economy Database (2008). Given α , tK , tL , and tY , the production function 
can be used to compute a series for tA .  This series was then detrended at 1.4% per year because, 
in balanced growth, if output and capital per worker are assumed to grow at 2% per year, then 
TFP would have to grow at 014.102.1 3.01 =− . 
To calibrate γ , data for individual countries were used.  First, the equilibrium real wage 
rate condition (3.4) was substituted into the condition for labor (3.8).  Next, observed values for 
ttt LCY ,, and tN  were used to compute annual values for γ  during the 1950-1975 period.  These 
                                                 
34 Calibrated similarly to Essay 1. 
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values were then averaged for each country.  This procedure resulted in γ  equal to 0.6427 in 
Portugal and 0.6416 in Spain.  Similarly, initial guesses for the effective tax rate on capital 
income, ktτ , were computed by first substituting the real rental rate condition (3.5) into the first 
order condition for capital (3.9) and setting β, δ, α, and tK  to the previously calibrated values.  
Next, observed values for tY  and tC  were used to estimate an annual series for 
k
tτ during the 
1950-1975 period.  Then these series were averaged and the guesses for ktτ  set at 0.4524 for 
Spain and 0.4271 for Portugal. 
Finally, the numerical experiments were conducted by using 1975K , 1974C , the parameters 
described above, along with the time series for tA  and tN , and then solving for the competitive 
equilibrium levels of tt LK ,1+ , and tC using (3.6), (3.8), and (3.9).  Given the model estimates 
for tt LK ,1+ , and tC , the guesses for 
k
tτ  were reset based on an endogenous computational 
approach so that the model would match the observed levels of employment rates and capital-
output ratios. 
The simulation exercises were programmed for a length of sixty-years, from which the 
first thirty corresponding to 1975-2004 period were the focus of our analysis. The additional 
years were included in order to insure that the equilibrium values during the period of interest are 
not influenced by the agent’s willingness to consume all his resources in the last period 
simulated. 
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3.2.2. The Implied Capital Tax Rates 
In order to assess the fit of the model to the Iberian economic data, the approach used in 
Essay 1 was adopted.  In particular, two regime changes for taxes were posited.  These regimes 
were separated by 1986, the date when European Community membership meant changes in 
domestic fiscal and monetary policies and massive inflows of structural funds, and 1994, the date 
when European Single Market and EU entries led to relevant domestic policy constraints.35  
Imposing these regimes on the numerical experiments ensured an exercise where the levels of the 
effective tax rate on capital income would enable each economy to achieve the observed capital-
output ratios and employment rates.   
Figure 3.A. shows the computed capital-output ratio and the employment rate results for 
the period of interest in Spain and Portugal.  The figure below shows that the model produces a 
fairly good fit for the Portuguese capital-output ratio but is not so accurate in the Spanish case. 
For Portugal, the main weakness is a small underestimate during the 1983-1987 period and a 
small overestimate between 1994 and 1999. For Spain, the fit is worse with the model frequently 
underestimating the capital-output ratio. 
For the employment rates, the model’s fit is quite poor for both countries.  Despite the 
fairly good fit for the 1977-1983 period, the model underestimates it in the subsequent periods by 
a considerable margin   In contrast, the model’s results for the Spanish employment rate are 
significantly overestimated (and quite inelastic) for most of the simulated period. 
                                                 
35 Based on Blakanoff (1992), Cheung and Chinn (1996), Tortella (2000), Fulvio (2001), Gunther et al. 
(2004), Lopes (2004a), Jimeno et al. (2006), Escosura and Roses (2007). 
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Figure 3.A  Simulation Results for the Model with only Capital Income Taxes 
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The average effective capital income taxes associated with each of the three regimes is 
summarized in Table 3A.  This table shows a steadily increasing tax rate in Spain that reaches 75 
percent in the later period and a hump shaped pattern for Portugal which has a peak tax rate of 75 
percent in the middle period. 
 
Table 3.A  Effective Tax Rates on Capital Income 
 Portugal Spain 
1975 0.427 0.150 
1986 0.750 0.550 
1994 0.500 0.750 
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Because the fit for the capital-output ratios and employment rate were not very good, a 
labor income tax was added to the baseline model to see if this might improve the performance. 
This addition is explored in the next section.  Such an addition seems like a reasonable 
possibility because the employment data in Figure 3.A appear to be somewhat elastic given the 
large swings, which could perhaps be due to a distortionary tax on labor income. 
 
3.3. Model with both Capital and Labor Income Taxes 
In this section, the previous model is modified by the inclusion of labor income taxes. In 
the following description the focus is mostly on this change.  Adding an income tax only alters 
the formulation of the consumer’s problem and the government budget constraint.  The corporate 
sector structure is unaffected. Furthermore, the utility function is still given by (3.1). The only 
change in the consumer problem occurs in the budget constraint which is modified to 
ttt
k
ttt
l
tttt TKrLwKKC +−−+−=−+ + ))(1()1(1 δττ , (3.10) 
where ltτ is the effective tax on labor income. The government budget is also modified so that the 
lump sum tax rebate, tT , is now given by 
tt
k
ttt
l
tt KrLwT )( δττ −+= . (3.11) 
The competitive equilibrium for this economy is defined as follows.  Given 1975K , tA  
and tN , the competitive equilibrium is prices { }0:, ≥twr tt , fiscal policy { }0:,, ≥tTtt tktlt , and 
allocations { }0:,,,,1 ≥+ tICYLK ttttt , such that: 
1. Agents optimize: 
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i. Given { }0:,,,,, ≥tNTttwr ttktlttt  and 1975K , the allocations { ,,,1 ttt CLK +  
}0: ≥tI t  solve the consumer's optimization problem. 
ii. Given { }0:,, ≥tAwr ttt , the allocations { }0:,, ≥tYLK ttt  solve the firms's 
optimization problem. 
2. Markets clear as stipulated in the previous model. 
3. The government budget constraint holds: 
tt
k
ttt
l
tt KrLwT )( δττ −+= , for t = 0,1,... 
The competitive equilibrium is now computed by solving the feasibility condition (3.10) 
for tC  and replacing it in the utility function (3.1) to get 
[ ]( ) ( ) ( ){ }∑
∞
=
+ −−++−+−−+−
1975
1 ln11))(1()1(ln
t
tttttt
k
ttt
l
t
t LNTKKrLw γδττγβ , 
(3.12) 
and solving the first order conditions with respect to labor and capital to get 
0
)()1(
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−−+∂
∂
γ
τ ttt
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LNwC
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U
, 
(3.13) 
and 
[ ] 01))(1(:
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=+−−−
∂
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−+
δτβ t
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K
U
. 
(3.14) 
Because capital and labor income taxes impact the optimality conditions, they play a role 
in the agent’s decision-making process and generate a distortionary effect on the decisions for 
1+tK and tL .  In what follows we adopted an endogenous computational approach, only this time, 
guesses for ltτ  are computed too following a calibration procedure similar to the one used for 
k
tτ .  
Specifically, guesses for ltτ  were computed by substituting the real wage rate condition (3.4) into 
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the first order condition for labor (3.13) and using the previously calibrated values for γ in each 
country along with the observed values for ttt NYC ,,  and tL  during 1950-1975.   
 
3.3.1. The Implied Capital and Labor Tax Rates 
In the following analysis, the same parameter calibration from the earlier analysis was 
used as were 1975K , 1974C , and the series for tA and tN .  The numerical experiment was similar 
only this time ltτ  was also computed.  These results are shown in Figure 3.B. 
 
Figure 3.B  Simulation Results for the Model with Capital and Labor Income Taxes 
Portugal Spain 
Capital-Output Ratio 
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003
 
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003
 
Employment Rate 
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003
 
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003
 
 ____ Model     _ _ _ Actual Data     
 
 78 
In the case of Portugal, the fit has somewhat improved because besides the fairly good 
job in tracing capital-output ratios, the ability to match the actual unemployment rate has 
improved.  The model’s fit for Spain has not improved with the addition of labor income taxes.  
Figure 3.B shows that there is a clear trade off between the ability of capturing the capital-output 
ratios and the unemployment rate when imposing only three fiscal regimes.  In fitting the model 
to the lower rates of employment by 1987, there has been a decrease in the model’s ability to 
capture the capital-output ratio over the entire period.  As in the model with no labor income tax, 
the main divergence between the simulated and the actual data arises in the employment rate. 
Table 3.B shows the effective income taxes on capital and labor income associated with 
the simulations displayed in the figure above.  The capital income tax for Portugal continues to 
show a hump shaped pattern, with the middle period displaying the highest tax rate.  However, 
the peak rate is lower, at 56 percent, than in the previous model without labor income taxes.  In 
addition, the model estimates labor income subsidies rather than taxes during the 1986-1975 
period.  For Spain, the model estimates a steadily decline in capital income taxes instead of the 
previous increase.  In relation to labor, taxes follow a hump shaped pattern which has a peak tax 
rate of 42 percent in the middle period. 
 
Table 3.B  Effective Tax Rates on Capital and Labor Income 
 Portugal Spain 
 Capital Labor Capital Labor 
1975 0.470 0.010 0.700 0.100 
1986 0.560 -0.140 0.500 0.420 
1994 0.500 -0.200 0.480 0.150 
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Because of the poor fitting performance, the next section investigates the hypothesis that 
taxes were allowed to change on an annual basis rather than having only three regimes as in the 
previous analysis. 
 
3.4. Exploiting the Conjuncture of Annual Tax Rates 
Although this conjuncture may sound controversial in other contexts, it could be the case 
that fiscal policy changed frequently in the Iberian economies during the post-1974 period.  For 
instance, Portugal initiated a democratization process in mid 1974.  The Carnation Revolution 
led to a rise in state monopolies, frequent changes in a range of policies and a long period of 
governmental instability: six provisional governments in the first two years of the post-
dictatorship period and eight constitutional governments over the 1976-83 period.36  The 1981-
83 currency crisis and the intervention by the IMF required significant constraints in fiscal and 
monetary policies.  By 1986, EC membership also implied continuous policy changes, for 
example, membership required deregulation of prices, market liberalization (such as massive 
privatizations in during the 1989-99 period), and the 1988 tax reform which was the most 
comprehensive since the 1960s.  In addition, adhesion to the European Single Market and E.U. in 
1993, promoted ongoing tax competition across E.U. members.  And, the long process of 
conversion to the euro currency, initiated by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, imposed another series 
of fiscal and monetary constraints, associated with adopting the euro as an accounting unit in 
1999 and to have the currency in circulation by 2002. 
                                                 
36 See Appendix A. 
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Spain followed a similar tumultuous experience over this period of time.  The death of 
Franco in November 1975 initiated the democratization process and numerous policy changes.  
In the early years, the key landmarks were the 1976 law on political reform, 1977 tax reform, and 
the 1979 EFTA agreement.  Despite a short period of relative stability in governing, Tejero’s 
failed coup d’état in 1981 uncovered the political and social fragilities of the young democracy.  
After 1986, the frequency and nature of policy changes in Spain were similar to those just 
outlined for Portugal as both joined the E.C., E.U., European Single Market, and Eurozone at the 
same time. 
Because the 1975-2004 period was characterized by significant changes in the Iberian 
fiscal and monetary policies, it seems reasonable to explore a model with frequent changes on 
the effective tax rates.   
 
3.4.1. The Implied Annual Capital and Labor Tax Rates 
The simulation results associated with annual effective tax rates are displayed in Figure 
3.C.  The figure shows that allowing annual changes in the average effective tax rates on labor 
and capital income results in a significant improvement in the model’s fit.  The only area in 
which the fit has trouble is for the first three periods.   
The effective tax rates associated with the fit portrayed in Figure 3.C. are presented in 
Table 3.C.  Again the capital tax for Portugal follows a hump shaped pattern with the highest rate 
of 61 percent occurring in 1994.  For labor income the model estimates a series of subsidies 
instead of taxes, except for 1978.  The 1978-1982 estimates for labor subsidies are close to nil, 
and then range around 13 to 20 percent of labor income during the 1983-1989 period.  
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Thereafter, the subsidies stay above 24 percent, reaching a first peak in 1991 (51 percent) and a 
second higher peak by 2004 (65 percent). 
 
Figure 3.C  Simulation Results for the Model with Annual Capital and Labor Income 
Taxes 
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For Spain, as shown in Table 3.C, the model estimates a decreasing pattern for capital 
income taxes during the period of interest, evolving from 94 percent in 1979 to 1 percent by 
2004.  In relation to labor income, the estimated tax series exhibits two consecutive hump 
shapes.  The first reaches its peak at 45 percent in 1985 and 1986 whereas the second wave hits a 
peak of 46 percent by 1994.  Interestingly, similar to the capital series, the labor income tax 
achieves its lower values in the post-2000 period, reaching a 5.5 percent bottom by 2004. 
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Table 3.C  Annual Effective Tax Rates on Capital and Labor Income 
 Portugal Spain 
 Capital Labor Capital Labor 
1975 0.310 -0.160 0.990 -0.030 
1976 0.420 -0.050 2.100 0.040 
1977 0.480 -0.010 1.028 0.140 
1978 0.470 0.010 0.850 0.200 
1979 0.470 -0.016 0.940 0.237 
1980 0.500 -0.050 0.800 0.310 
1981 0.500 -0.020 0.740 0.340 
1982 0.500 -0.015 0.540 0.370 
1983 0.500 -0.200 0.750 0.380 
1984 0.480 -0.200 0.360 0.430 
1985 0.460 -0.170 0.440 0.450 
1986 0.450 -0.130 0.430 0.450 
1987 0.450 -0.160 0.420 0.430 
1988 0.460 -0.170 0.590 0.410 
1989 0.470 -0.200 0.620 0.390 
1990 0.530 -0.410 0.590 0.380 
1991 0.570 -0.510 0.570 0.390 
1992 0.565 -0.420 0.560 0.410 
1993 0.600 -0.360 0.465 0.450 
1994 0.610 -0.260 0.510 0.460 
1995 0.580 -0.240 0.610 0.450 
1996 0.530 -0.260 0.300 0.420 
1997 0.520 -0.280 0.100 0.390 
1998 0.520 -0.320 0.300 0.350 
1999 0.520 -0.380 0.170 0.290 
2000 0.490 -0.415 0.267 0.230 
2001 0.510 -0.500 0.190 0.180 
2002 0.510 -0.500 0.200 0.160 
2003 0.510 -0.530 0.130 0.120 
2004 0.470 -0.650 0.010 0.055 
 
3.4.1.1. Testing for Unit Roots and Structural Breaks in the Simulated Tax Series 
To further scrutinize the possibility of significant annual changes in the Iberian fiscal 
policies, this section uses the estimated tax series for capital and labor income to investigate 
implications of the series empirically.  The framework described in Enders (2004) is employed to 
assess the presence of deterministic regressors while the tests for structural breaks are based on 
the methodology outlined in Maddala (2001). Succinctly, we begin by determining the 
appropriate number of differenced dependent variable terms that should be included in each tax 
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series model.37  In addition, we plot the tax series outlined in Table 3.C to speculate if a drift, a 
drift and a trend, or none should be added to the econometric model.  However, to avoid 
misspecification, we initiate the unit root assessment with the most general of models.  Next, the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is implemented (or the simple Dickey-Fuller test if the 
regression does not include lagged differences) and the resulting ADF test statistic is used to 
determine if the null hypothesis can be rejected, i.e. if we can dismiss the possibility that the tax 
series follows a unit root process.  Failing to reject the null suggests that the series is 
nonstationary.38  The final step to econometrically support the conjuncture of significant annual 
changes in the Iberian fiscal policies comprises Chow tests on each nonstationary tax series to 
identify a set of potential years in which there were changes in fiscal regime.39 
We begin with the test for unit roots (i.e. nonstationarity) for the Portuguese tax series.  
To illustrate the concept of unit root, assume the following AR(1) process  
ttt yay εθ ++= −10 , (3.15) 
where 0a (drift) and θ  are the parameters to be estimated, tε is assumed to be white-noise, and t 
stands for the time period. The series ( y ) is assumed to be stationary if -1< θ <1 because, for 
example, when θ =1 the variance of y increases with time and converges toward infinity (i.e. a 
random walk plus drift). Hence, a series is said to be stationary if we can reject the null 
hypothesis, H0: θ =1 (against H1: θ <1), which is equivalent to test H0: γ  = 0 (against H1: γ  <0) 
if we subtract 1−ty  from both sides of the equation (3.15), 
                                                 
37 See Enders (2004), p. 191-4. 
38 See Enders (2004), p. 210-4. 
39 See Maddala (2001), p. 173-5 and 313. 
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ttt yay εγ ++=∆ −10 , (3.16) 
where ty∆  is equal to 1−− tt yy , and γ  = 0 only if θ =1.  However, the assessment of unit roots is 
far more complicated if the series is correlated with higher order lags and/or if it has a time trend.  
In order to contemplate all possible scenarios we adopt the methodology described in Enders 
(2004), and therefore we begin by assuming the most general of models 
t
i
ititt ytayay εβγ
ρ
∑
=
−− +∆+++=∆
1
210 , (3.17) 
where ρ  is the number of lagged differences of the dependent variable to be included in the 
regression, and 0a , γ , 2a , iβ  are the parameters to be estimated.   
 A potential problem associated with the use of the general model is the inclusion of 
irrelevant variables because these reduce the power of the test.  On the other hand, for example, 
if we do not include enough lags, the regression residuals do not behave like white-noise.  
Consequently, the model will not capture the actual error process and therefore the parameters 
and the respective standard errors will not be estimated correctly.  To avoid these issues we need 
to determine the appropriate number of lags to be included ( ρ ).  Enders (2004) recommends the 
estimation of  
t
i
ititt yyay εβγ
ρ
∑
=
−− +∆++=∆
1
10 , (3.18) 
with a relatively long lag length and to sequentially reduce the number of lags using the t-test.  
The appropriate lag length is identified when the last lag included in the regression becomes 
significantly different than zero.  Applying this procedure to the Portuguese tax series for capital 
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and labor income suggests that the proper lag length is equal to 1 and zero, respectively.40  The 
detailed statistical results are displayed in Appendix C.  The estimated regression for the tax 
series on capital income yields 
ty∆   =  0.0933   -  0.1857 1−ty  +  0.3445 1−∆ ty  + tε , (3.19) 
   (0.0479)  (0.0941)  (0.1361)  RSS = 0.0127  
 
where SSR stands for the sum of the squared residuals for this model. The results indicate a t-
statistics of 2.53 for 1β , hence the coefficient is significantly different than zero at the 95 percent 
confidence level (tcritical for 25 degrees of freedom is 2.048).  For the Portuguese tax series on 
labor income, the results are given by 
ty∆   = -0.0311   -  0.0580 1−ty  +  0.3271 1−∆ ty  + tε , (3.20) 
          (0.0235) (0.0832) (0.1971) RSS = 0.1228   
 
therefore we were unable to reject the null that 1β  is significantly different than zero, given that 
its t-statistics is equal to 1.66. 
The next step comprises the graphical analysis of the data.  The plots of the estimated 
levels of capital and labor income taxes displayed in Table 3.C are shown in Figure 3.D.  The 
graph for capital income tax seems to indicate that there is no deterministic trend but it is not 
very helpful to assess the presence of a drift over the entire period, particularly due to the post-
1995 path.  The plot for the Portuguese labor income tax suggests the presence of a drift and a 
negative time trend over the entire period.  Given that the graphical analysis does not guarantee 
avoidance of misspecification, we proceed using the most general of models (3.17) as suggested 
by Enders (2004). 
 
                                                 
40 We initiated the exercise with a lag length equal to 6 (a relatively long number of lags since we are 
investigating annual tax series). 
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Figure 3.D  Annual Effective Income Taxes in Portugal 
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The estimation of the unrestricted model (3.17) for the Portuguese tax series on capital 
income yields41 
ty∆   =  0.0958   -   0.1941 1−ty  +  0.0001 t  +  0.3525 1−∆ ty  + tε , (3.21) 
         (0.0517) (0.1108) (0.0007)   (0.1487)   SSR = 0.0126  
 
and therefore we are unable to reject the null that γ  is significantly different than zero because 
its t-statistics is equal to -1.75 and the ττ critical value is -3.60 for a 95 percent confidence 
level.42  Consequently, we need to test if 2a = 0 given γ = 0 (i.e. if the time trend should be 
                                                 
41 The detailed estimation results are shown in Appendix C. 
42 The empirical cumulative distribution of τ is given in Enders (2004), p. 439. 
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excluded given that the series follows a unit root process).  To do so, we first have to estimate 
the restricted model, 
t
i
itit yay εβ
ρ
∑
=
− +∆+=∆
1
0 , (3.22) 
in order to compute the following φ -statistic 
( ) ( )
( )
kT
edunrestrictSSR
r
edunrestrictSSRrestrictedSSR
i
−
−
=φ , (3.23) 
where r is the number of restrictions being tested, T is the number of usable observations, k the 
number of parameters estimated in the unrestricted model, and i = 1, 2, 3.  1φ  is used to test H0: 
0a = γ = 0, 2φ  is used to test H0: 0a = γ = 2a = 0, and 3φ  is used to test H0: γ = 2a = 0.  
Estimating (3.22) gives 
ty∆   = -0.0311   +  0.3758 1−∆ ty  + tε , (3.24) 
          (0.0009)  (0.1425)    SSR = 0.0146    
 
hence 3φ = 1.8836, based on the SSR values from (3.21) and (3.24), r = 2, T = 28, and k = 4.  
Since the empirical distribution of 3φ  indicates a critical value is 7.24, we fail to reject H0: γ = 
2a = 0 at the 95 percent confidence level.
43  Consequently we proceed by estimating a new 
(unrestricted) model which does not include a time trend, 
t
i
ititt yyay εβγ
ρ
∑
=
−− +∆++=∆
1
10 . (3.25) 
 The statistical results derived from applying (3.25) on the Portuguese tax series for 
capital income are identical to those shown in (3.19), and therefore we are not able to reject the 
                                                 
43 The empirical distribution of iφ  is given in Enders (2004), p. 440. 
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null that γ  is significantly different than zero because its t-statistics is equal to -1.97 and the τµ 
critical value is -3.00 (for a 95 percent confidence level).44  Next, we need to examine if the drift 
( 0a ) should be removed from our model.  This can be assessed by testing if 0a  = 0 givenγ = 0.  
Hence, we estimated the following restricted model on the Portuguese data for capital income tax 
t
i
itit yy εβ
ρ
∑
=
− +∆=∆
1
, (3.26) 
to get  
ty∆   =  0.3696 1−∆ ty  + tε . (3.27) 
    (0.1365) SSR = 0.0147   
  
Using the SSR values from (3.19) and (3.27), r = 2, T = 28, and k = 3, we found 1φ = 
1.9690.  By comparing the latter value with the 1φ  critical value of 5.18 for a 95 percent 
confidence level, we fail to reject H0: 0a = γ = 0.  Based on all of the above, the final step to 
assess the presence of a unit root in the time series for the Portuguese capital income tax is to test 
if γ = 0 in the following model 
t
i
ititt yyy εβγ
ρ
∑
=
−− +∆+=∆
1
1 . (3.28) 
  
Estimating (3.28) yields 
ty∆   = - 0.0033 1−ty  +  0.3806 1−∆ ty  + tε , (3.29) 
          (0.0090)   (0.1419)   SSR = 0.0146   
 
                                                 
44 The empirical cumulative distribution of τ is given in Enders (2004), p. 439. 
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and consequently we are able to conclude that the series for capital income taxes in Portugal 
follows a unit root process because the t-statistics for γ  is -0.37, which is lower (in absolute 
value) than the τ critical value of -1.95, at a 95 percent confidence level. 
 Following a procedure similar to the one just outlined, we concluded that the tax series 
for the Portuguese labor income tax also follows a unit root process, with a 95 percent 
confidence level (the statistical results are shown in Appendix C). 
Finally, the Chow tests were conducted to identify structural breaks in each of the 
Portuguese tax series.  These tests can be conducted based on two different procedures, the 
dummy variables test or the sum of squares test - both lead to similar F-statistics values. Here we 
adopt the latter procedure. Briefly, the methodology employs the first n1 observations to estimate 
the regression equation and applies it to predict the following n2 observations.
45  If n2>1, we can 
use the following F-test to assess structural breaks 
1
1
1
1
2
−−
−
=
kn
RSS
n
RSSRRSS
F , 
(3.30) 
where RRSS is the residual sum of squares from the regression based on n1+ n2 observations, and 
RSS1 stands for the residual sum of squares from the regression based on n1 observations. In 
addition, we can also use the log-likelihood ratio statistic to conduct the test for the structural 
breaks. This latter statistic is computed by comparing the restricted and unrestricted maximum of 
the log likelihood function.46  
                                                 
45 See Maddala (2001), p. 173-5. 
46 Both use the whole sample but the unrestricted includes a dummy variable for the years of interest. 
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Based on this simple Chow test for structural breaks, the results suggest that the capital 
income tax series has potential structural breaks in 1979, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, 
1997, and 2000 with a 95 percent confidence level according to the F-statistic results (probability 
= 0.047) and 99 percent when using the log likelihood ratio (probability = 0.000).47  For labor 
income tax, the Chow test indicates probable breaks in 1980, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1995, 
1998, and 2002 with a 95 percent confidence level using the F-statistic (probability = 0.026) and 
99 percent using the log likelihood ratio (probability = 0.000).  Therefore, the econometric tests 
provide additional support to the conjuncture of frequent changes in the Portuguese fiscal regime 
during the 1975-2004 period. 
A similar econometric study was elaborated for the effective tax series in Spain.48  The 
procedure to select the appropriate lag length ( ρ ) for the differenced dependent variable terms 
suggests the inclusion of two lags in the econometric model for the capital income tax series and 
one lag in the labor income tax model.  The visual inspection of each income tax series, Figure 
3.E (plotted using data from Table 3.C), seems to reveal that an econometric model for the 
capital income tax should include a drift and a trend given the declining path during the overall 
period, whereas the time path of the estimated labor income tax signals the presence of an 
upward trend from 1975 to 1986 and a downward trend during the post-1995 period, therefore 
suggesting that a drift and trend should be included in the econometric model.   
                                                 
47 Using Eviews 3.1. 
48 The detailed statistical results are shown in Appendix D. 
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Figure 3.E  Annual Effective Income Taxes in Spain 
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The unit roots tests on the Spanish capital income tax reveal that this series does not 
follow a unit root process, whereas for the labor income tax series the methodology points to the 
presence of a unit root with a 95 percent confidence level.  The Chow tests on the Spanish taxes 
signal that the capital income tax series has potential structural breaks in 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 
and 1998, with a 99 percent confidence level according to the F-statistic results (probability = 
0.006) and the log likelihood ratio (probability = 0.000).  For labor income tax, the Chow tests 
indicate probable breaks in 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2002 with a 95 
percent confidence level using the F-statistic (probability = 0.035) and 99 percent using the log 
likelihood ratio (probability = 0.000). 
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In summary, based on the political and socioeconomic context, the fact that the 
econometric analysis suggests multiple structural breaks, and that three out of the four tax series 
follow unit root processes, the assumption of significant annual changes in fiscal policy during 
the post-1974 period appears plausible.   
Unfortunately, the numerical results outlined in Table 3.C. indicate an unrealistic case of 
permanent labor subsidies in Portugal given that it is widely known that labor in Continental 
Europe is actually heavily taxed – for example, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) argue that rising 
unemployment in Europe during the 1965-1995 period was mainly due to high and rising tax 
burden on labor income.  To investigate this problem further two additional scenarios were 
contemplated: a) the data used for the employment rate is overestimated; b) the calibration 
procedure underestimates the consumption preferences. 
 
3.4.2. The Case of an Overestimated Employment Rate 
The basis for this scenario is founded on the popular belief that employment rates are 
often overestimated in the Mediterranean countries because of an underestimation of the number 
of people willing to work.  This problem is particularly acute during election years.  The 
literature on this topic is scarce but it is a theme commonly discussed in the local media.  
Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) briefly analyze the disparities between the official and real 
unemployment numbers in the Iberian economies and argue that these might be correlated with 
the individual costs and benefits associated with registration in the unemployment centers. 
This section explores the popular belief that the employment rates are actually 
overestimated and speculates that the discrepancy is about 20 percent of the value that the data 
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indicates for both countries.  For example, if the data set indicates a 5 percent unemployment 
rate, we would expect the actual number to be about 6 percent. 
A new simulation contemplating our deflated employment rates implies the levels of 
average effective tax rates shown in Table 3.D.   
 
Table 3.D  Annual Effective Tax Rates with Overestimated Employment Rate 
 Portugal Spain 
 Capital Labor Capital Labor 
1975 3.000 0.086 4.500 0.175 
1976 3.100 0.275 4.100 0.332 
1977 0.750 0.439 3.300 0.450 
1978 0.720 0.453 0.855 0.535 
1979 0.580 0.449 0.835 0.552 
1980 0.600 0.446 0.800 0.581 
1981 0.530 0.458 0.760 0.597 
1982 0.520 0.460 0.560 0.612 
1983 0.530 0.395 0.775 0.622 
1984 0.450 0.381 0.520 0.642 
1985 0.430 0.397 0.600 0.659 
1986 0.420 0.412 0.530 0.656 
1987 0.390 0.407 0.500 0.647 
1988 0.330 0.407 0.600 0.640 
1989 0.325 0.390 0.550 0.635 
1990 0.560 0.328 0.500 0.633 
1991 0.580 0.290 0.510 0.631 
1992 0.600 0.314 0.500 0.641 
1993 0.820 0.332 0.450 0.658 
1994 0.620 0.370 0.480 0.665 
1995 0.660 0.380 0.485 0.657 
1996 0.540 0.380 0.410 0.645 
1997 0.520 0.375 0.175 0.630 
1998 0.480 0.358 0.365 0.613 
1999 0.460 0.350 0.275 0.586 
2000 0.400 0.335 0.290 0.560 
2001 0.380 0.315 0.245 0.546 
2002 0.340 0.298 0.255 0.534 
2003 0.320 0.283 0.195 0.516 
2004 0.290 0.241 0.110 0.493 
 
Note that all tax figures are positive in Table 3.D. The graphical demonstration of the 
model’s fit is a replica of Figure 3.C.  It is worth mentioning that the model is still unable to 
attain a perfect fit during the first three periods simulated. 
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Section 3.5 will present a comparative analysis of all annual tax series estimated for each 
different scenario, so we will delay the detailed discussion of the results for later.  But, as an 
insight toward that assessment, note that the only significant consequence of assuming lower 
employment rates is an inflated labor income tax series since the capital tax values remain within 
the same range as in the baseline scenario of annual changes in fiscal policy.  Graphically, this 
means that the curves of each estimated tax series are pretty much scaled replications of each 
other. 
 
3.4.3. The Case of Underestimated Consumption Preferences 
Another hypothetical scenario was built on the assumption that the levels of relative 
consumption preferences (γ ) used in all previous simulations are actually lower than the “true” 
values.  The calibration procedure outlined in Section 3.2.1 ascertained the level of relative 
preferences to be about 0.64 in each country.  This last scenario investigates the conjuncture that 
the trueγ  could be around 0.8.  The relative lack of empirical dynamic general equilibrium 
studies on the Iberian economies makes it difficult to explicitly support this claim.  Nonetheless, 
recent figures of the European Central Bank (Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano, 2006) indicate a 
dramatic increase in the Iberian household indebtedness ratios. Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano 
(2006) show that according to quarterly data for the 1997-2004 period, the ratio of household 
indebtedness surged about 100 percent in Portugal and 68 percent in Spain, which by 2004 meant 
that the level of debt was about 100 percent of the household income in Portugal and near 80 
percent in Spain.  Using these figures as a proxy for relative consumption preferences, then it 
might be the case that the true values for both countries are actually higher than those initially 
calibrated in the previous simulations.   
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Table 3.E  Annual Effective Tax Rates with Underestimated Consumption Preferences 
 Portugal Spain 
 Capital Labor Capital Labor 
1975 -0.530 0.521 1.600 0.540 
1976 0.050 0.535 1.300 0.585 
1977 0.480 0.547 1.100 0.612 
1978 0.630 0.550 0.990 0.635 
1979 0.500 0.540 0.870 0.654 
1980 0.510 0.531 0.780 0.683 
1981 0.529 0.540 0.710 0.702 
1982 0.516 0.544 0.640 0.713 
1983 0.500 0.465 0.670 0.724 
1984 0.480 0.460 0.450 0.742 
1985 0.460 0.475 0.630 0.753 
1986 0.450 0.500 0.670 0.756 
1987 0.420 0.477 0.460 0.747 
1988 0.430 0.470 0.490 0.737 
1989 0.470 0.450 0.530 0.732 
1990 0.530 0.370 0.490 0.727 
1991 0.570 0.300 0.470 0.727 
1992 0.565 0.350 0.465 0.737 
1993 0.680 0.390 0.460 0.752 
1994 0.610 0.426 0.456 0.760 
1995 0.700 0.450 0.540 0.750 
1996 0.525 0.435 0.410 0.737 
1997 0.515 0.427 0.310 0.727 
1998 0.510 0.405 0.330 0.708 
1999 0.490 0.386 0.270 0.684 
2000 0.470 0.360 0.290 0.656 
2001 0.500 0.334 0.250 0.639 
2002 0.490 0.319 0.300 0.625 
2003 0.470 0.310 0.200 0.607 
2004 0.350 0.255 0.100 0.592 
 
The numerical results associated with the hypothetical scenario of γ  equal to 0.8 are 
shown above in Table 3.E.  Once again, all tax series are positive (except for the Portuguese 
capital income tax in 1975) and the pattern remains unchanged.  Moreover, the graphical 
illustration of the model’s fit is still a replica of Figure 3.C. 
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3.5. The Iberian Fiscal Experiences 
The numerical experiments conducted in this study produced a set of estimated series for 
effective tax rates on capital and labor income using one of the sophisticated tools currently 
available in macroeconomic analysis.  Like any other economic estimates, these are ad hoc 
measures that should be interpreted with caution since they were computed within a framework 
that does not necessarily capture all the features of the real world.  
In section 3.4, a set of annual effective tax series was derived based on three different 
simulation exercises.  A so-called baseline scenario where the model was calibrated as described 
in section 3.2.1., a second scenario which assumed that the employment rates observed in the 
data were overestimated by about 20 percent, and a third scenario that imposed inflated 
consumption preferences and therefore γ  was reset at 0.8 for both countries.   
The discussion that follows focuses on expansionary and contractionary fiscal regimes 
rather than on the estimated levels for effective capital and labor income taxes based on the 
acknowledgment outlined above that the framework employed in this essay does not necessarily 
contemplates all aspects that characterize the Iberian economies.  Therefore, the fluctuations 
present on each estimated tax series are probably more reliable than the estimated levels.  The 
latter inference is in line with De Hann et al. (2004) who argue that, regardless of the 
methodology employed to estimate effective tax rates on capital and labor income, the derived 
series are often highly correlated overtime, though significantly different in terms of estimated 
levels. 
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3.5.1. The Portuguese Fiscal Experience 
Figure 3.F summarizes the results for capital income taxes in Portugal.  The plot has been 
confined to post-1978 data given that in the simulation results outlined in the previous section, 
the model took three time periods to capture the actual ratios of both factor inputs.  As these 
initial values are considered outliers they have not been included in the graphs because otherwise 
the plotting scale would prevent inferring any significant differences across the estimated tax 
series during those periods that the model actually fits the observed capital and labor ratios.  
As shown in the figure below, all the scenarios capture similar timings for expansionary 
and contractionary fiscal regimes on capital income despite recording different magnitudes for 
those changes. 
 
Figure 3.F  The Portuguese Effective Tax Series on Capital Income (all scenarios) 
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According to Figure 3.F, the average effective tax on capital income decreased from 1978 
until 1987.  This result is consistent with Carreira’s (1984) observation that statutory tax rates in 
Portugal, after increasing vigorously, and frequently from 1968 to 1979, experienced a turning 
point by 1980 – for example, in 1979 the statutory tax rates on capital income where between 25 
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and 85.6 percent, depending on the income bracket, while by 1982 they were somewhat lower, 
ranging from 20.7 to 82.6 percent.  The decline in capital income taxes continued throughout the 
1980s.  Martins (2000, p.279) provides data supporting that statutory corporate taxes decreased 
from 35 to 45 percent in 1984, to a range of 30 to 35 percent by 1988. 
In the 1989-1993 period, all estimated series for capital income tax show an upward 
movement.  This increase might be associated with the 1988 changes in the tax code, the most 
important tax reform in Portugal since the 1960s (Martins, 2000).  Carreira (1990), reveals that in 
1989 the key reference rate for corporate taxes in Portugal - the so-called IRC after 1988, which 
excludes other taxes paid by firms such as municipal taxes - rose to 40.1 percent, a level well 
above the 30 to 35 percent range mentioned by Martins (2000) for 1988. 
In the simulations’ results, the post-1996 era was characterized by a steady decline in the 
effective capital income tax.  These estimates are consistent with the advent of increasing fiscal 
competition among the European Single Market member states, fostered by the free mobility of 
capital and labor.  Leite and Machado (2001) point out that the IRC declined steadily between 
1998 and 2004, from 34 to 30 percent. The OECD’s Policy Brief of July 2008 further confirms 
this downward trend until the year of 2007, when the IRC reached approximately 28 percent. 
 We now turn the discussion to effective tax rates on labor income.  As depicted in Figure 
3.E, the estimates obtained by all scenarios consistently capture the same cyclical changes in the 
effective labor tax despite the discrepancies in levels. 
 
 99 
Figure 3.G  The Portuguese Effective Tax Series on Labor Income (all scenarios) 
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As previously mentioned, the hypothesis of a thirty year subsidy suggested by the 
baseline scenario finds no support in the literature.  Consequently, during the process of 
reporting corroborating evidence to the estimated changes in fiscal regimes, the levels proposed 
by the baseline scenario will be omitted from the discussion. 
 According to Carreira (1984, p.441), statutory labor income taxes were in the 21.8 to 83.9 
percent range in 1979.  A decade later, as a result of the 1988 tax reform, the newly introduced 
IRS was set at 15 percent (Carreira, 1990, p.25).  The estimates in this essay indicate an average 
effective labor income tax in the 44.9 to 54 percent range in 1979 and also suggest a decline of 
the labor tax by 1989, to somewhere between 39 to 45 percent. 
 The tendency to decrease labor taxes became more evident after adhesion to the 
European Single Market in 1993.  Edwards and Mitchell (2008), claim that most of the resulting 
tax cuts were supply-side oriented and aimed at reducing the costs of productive activities, such 
as working and investing.  Moreover, the authors also state that Portugal and Spain were among 
the countries that implemented the most dramatic reductions on top income tax rates between 
1985 and 2007. 
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 Given the analysis above, the suggested effective tax series for both capital and labor 
income in Portugal seem to do a fairly good job assessing fiscal regime changes during the post-
dictatorship period. Is this also the case for the Spanish experience?  
 
3.5.2. The Spanish Fiscal Experience 
 To a certain extent, the nature and timing of the changes in the Iberian fiscal regimes 
were quite similar, particularly those for average effective tax rates on capital income.  As shown 
in Figure 3.H, the simulation results indicate an analogous downward trend on the capital income 
tax during the post-1975 period, despite the occasional clear spikes in 1983, 1985, and 1995. 
 Data from the OECD Taxdatabase (2008) indicates that the statutory corporate income 
tax rate increased slightly from 33 to 35 percent during the 1982-1986 period and that it 
remained at this level until 1995. Using the corporate tax as a proxy for effective tax rate on 
capital income, this evidence supports the relative stagnation shown in Figure 3.H for the same 
period.  Additional corroborating evidence is found in Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000).  Based 
on the numerical experiments of the latter authors, the average effective capital income tax was 
31.4 percent during the 1986-1990 period, and 31.9 percent between 1991 and 1997. 
Another noteworthy conclusion shown in Figure 3.H is that the model captures the fiscal 
regime change implied by the European Single Market adhesion under all scenarios.  As in the 
Portuguese case, the OECD’s Policy Brief in July 2008 indicates that the Spanish average 
statutory corporate income tax rate decreased between 1994 and 2007, though more modestly 
(from 35 to 33 percent).  Nonetheless, Edwards and Mitchell (2008) confirm the continuity of 
this downward trend by claiming that the top statutory tax rate on capital income declined to 30 
percent by 2008.  
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Figure 3.H  The Spanish Effective Tax Series on Capital Income (all scenarios) 
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In relation to average effective taxes on labor income, the numerical experiments 
displayed in Figure 3.I indicate a steady increase in the early years of democratization.  This 
estimated upward trend in the effective labor tax along with the relatively high unemployment 
benefits mentioned by Blanchard et al. (1995), might indeed be the justification for the steep 
decline observed in the employment rate until 1986 because both would create a downward 
pressure on the opportunity cost of leisure. 
When comparing the figure below with Figure 3.E, it is clear that the shapes of the curves 
are quite the same since joining the European Community in 1986, indicating that the Iberian 
countries implemented similar policies during this period.  Specifically, the plots indicate a 
simultaneous increase in taxes until 1994, followed by another similar period of decreasing tax 
rates.  Hence, reinforcing the fact that embracing the European economic and political project 
resulted in the implementation of similar fiscal regimes, and consequently, analogous effects on 
the effective tax rates since then.  
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Figure 3.I  The Spanish Effective Tax Series on Labor Income (all scenarios) 
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Evidence to support the path of the estimated tax series portrayed in Figure 3.I was found 
in the Carey and Tchilinguirian’s (2000) claim that the effective tax on labor income increased 
between the 1980-1985 and 1986-1990 periods, moving from 24.2 to a 27.7 percent average.  
Therefore, confirming our estimated average levels for the labor tax during the same both 
periods since a cursory look at the plot reveals that the average of our estimated levels for the 
1980-1985 must be necessarily lower the averaged value of our annual estimates for the 1986-
1990 period. 
For the decrease observed in Figure 3.I during the 1986-1990 period, we find support in 
Edwards and Mitchell (2008) as they endorse the claim that the labor tax, though high in relative 
terms comparatively to the early democratic years, might have declined between 1986 and 1990 
period given that the top individual income tax rate decreased from 66 to 56 percent during this 
period.  In relation to the 1991-1997 period, Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) state that the 
average effective tax rate increased to an average of 30.4 percent. This latter claim supports, to a 
certain extent, the increase depicted in Figure 3.I for the 1991-1995 period. 
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The significant decrease estimated for the effective labor income tax during the post-1995 
period is also corroborated by Edwards and Mitchell’s (2008) claim that the top individual 
income tax decreased from 56 to 40 percent between 1995 and 2005. This latter movement in the 
tax rates is also supported by the two tax cuts mentioned in Appendix A, namely in 1999 and 
2002, along with the increasing fiscal competition within the European Single Market. 
 Overall, it seems that the model’s fit to the Spanish economy is satisfactory under all 
scenarios because it is able to capture the changes in fiscal regimes that occurred during the post-
dictatorship period. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 Because true economies are far more complicated than any economic model, some 
simplification has to be adopted. This is particularly true of the tax system. Empirical studies of 
taxes are often confined to the analysis of effective tax rates, which measure the net amount of 
tax levied on the activity of interest based on the underlying framework assumptions. 
 This essay brings additional elements to existing work, such as a set of estimates for the 
average annual effective tax rates on capital and labor that might have been present in the Iberian 
Peninsula during the 1975-2004 period.  As in any economic model, the validity of the proposed 
tax rates depends on how accurately the framework employed reflects the complexities of the 
real world.  Although the methodology employed here does not necessarily capture all aspects 
that characterize the Iberian economies, it is believed that the tax series implied by the model are 
as meaningful as modern macroeconomics models allow. 
 The main contribution of this study is the estimated changes in average effective tax rates 
on capital and labor income under several scenarios and the evidence that these are consistent 
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with the changes in fiscal policy asserted in the literature for the post-dictatorship experiences of 
the Iberian economies. In addition, the suggested tax series can serve as a reference for more in-
depth research on the Portuguese and Spanish fiscal policies and how these may have 
constrained or fostered economic growth. 
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Appendix B - Mathematical Appendix 
Because of the unusual interpretation that the labor market situation is located at a 
boundary, it is easiest to think of the social planning problem as a two step problem where in the 
first step a representative agent makes all the allocation decisions taking prices as given and then 
in the second step equilibrium rental rates and wage rates are applied.  To this end, the 
Lagrangian for this problem is 
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The first order conditions for t=0,1,… are 
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Substituting in (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) gives the social planner's first order conditions for 
t=0,1,… of 
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To find the decision rules we use the method of undetermined coefficients. We guess the 
functional forms 
tkkt yai = , (2.20) 
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where zk aa ,  and λa are constants to be determined. Substituting these into (2.17) and solving for 
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Substituting these into (2.18) and solving for za  gives 
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To find the consumption decision rule substitute (2.20) and (2.21) into (2.19) and solve 
for tc  to get 
tzkt yaac )1( −−= . (2.23) 
We can interpret )1( zk aa −−  as the marginal propensity to consume out of income. 
Note, this is simply the decision rule from the Solow model. To find the labor decision rule we 
substitute (2.15) into (2.16) and using (2.1) gives get 
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Finally, we need to verify that our guess was correct by verifying that λa  is a constant. 
To do this, substitute (2.15) into (2.16) to get 
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Next, substitute (2.22) into (2.15) get 
tt
t
t yahBc λ
ηγ =+− )1( . 
Now substituting in (2.23) and (2.24) and solving for λa  gives 
η
θθ
λ
zk
zk aaa
−−
−−−=
1
)1( , 
which is a constant and thus confirms our guess. 
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Appendix C - Stata Code and Results for the Portuguese Tax Series  
Using Stata (version 10.0) and the Portuguese tax series for capital income displayed in 
Table 3.C, we have programmed the code below and obtained the following results: 
 
. gen klag1=taxak[_n-1] 
(1 missing value generated) 
 
. gen d_taxak = taxak[_n] - taxak[_n-1] 
(1 missing value generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag1 = d_taxak[_n-1] 
(2 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag2 = d_taxak[_n-2] 
(3 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag3 = d_taxak[_n-3] 
(4 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag4 = d_taxak[_n-4] 
(5 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag5 = d_taxak[_n-5] 
(6 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag6 = d_taxak[_n-6] 
(7 missing values generated) 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 d_taxaklag3 d_taxaklag4 d_taxaklag5 d_taxaklag6 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      23 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,    15) =    1.41 
       Model |   .00556756     7  .000795366           Prob > F      =  0.2707 
    Residual |   .00844331    15  .000562887           R-squared     =  0.3974 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1161 
       Total |   .01401087    22  .000636858           Root MSE      =  .02373 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.2640385    .161518    -1.63   0.123     -.608306     .080229 
 d_taxaklag1 |    .393755   .2545972     1.55   0.143    -.1489061    .9364161 
 d_taxaklag2 |   .1637982   .2597306     0.63   0.538    -.3898045     .717401 
 d_taxaklag3 |   .0631868   .2646678     0.24   0.815    -.5009394     .627313 
 d_taxaklag4 |   .3363426   .2737645     1.23   0.238    -.2471726    .9198577 
 d_taxaklag5 |  -.2877445   .2779455    -1.04   0.317    -.8801713    .3046823 
 d_taxaklag6 |  -.0121483   .2002474    -0.06   0.952    -.4389655    .4146689 
       _cons |   .1352105   .0827244     1.63   0.123    -.0411123    .3115333 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 d_taxaklag3 d_taxaklag4 d_taxaklag5 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      24 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,    17) =    1.87 
       Model |  .005565133     6  .000927522           Prob > F      =  0.1455 
    Residual |  .008447367    17  .000496904           R-squared     =  0.3972 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1844 
       Total |    .0140125    23  .000609239           Root MSE      =  .02229 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.2591411   .1362918    -1.90   0.074    -.5466918    .0284095 
 d_taxaklag1 |   .3945169   .2146675     1.84   0.084     -.058392    .8474257 
 d_taxaklag2 |   .1632046   .2432102     0.67   0.511     -.349924    .6763333 
 d_taxaklag3 |   .0581849   .2396139     0.24   0.811    -.4473562    .5637261 
 d_taxaklag4 |   .3362264   .2369712     1.42   0.174    -.1637392    .8361919 
 d_taxaklag5 |  -.3053957   .1727639    -1.77   0.095    -.6698957    .0591042 
       _cons |    .132627   .0696381     1.90   0.074    -.0142966    .2795506 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 d_taxaklag3 d_taxaklag4 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      25 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    19) =    1.88 
       Model |  .004944788     5  .000988958           Prob > F      =  0.1458 
    Residual |  .010005212    19   .00052659           R-squared     =  0.3308 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1546 
       Total |      .01495    24  .000622917           Root MSE      =  .02295 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
       klag1 |  -.2760625    .121744    -2.27   0.035    -.5308755   -.0212495 
 d_taxaklag1 |   .4276933   .2200912     1.94   0.067     -.032963    .8883495 
 d_taxaklag2 |   .0691991   .2442383     0.28   0.780    -.4419976    .5803958 
 d_taxaklag3 |   .1861736   .2190308     0.85   0.406     -.272263    .6446103 
 d_taxaklag4 |   .1045242   .1661463     0.63   0.537     -.243224    .4522724 
       _cons |   .1392091   .0621358     2.24   0.037     .0091573    .2692608 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 d_taxaklag3 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      26 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,    21) =    2.06 
       Model |  .004211113     4  .001052778           Prob > F      =  0.1227 
    Residual |  .010738887    21  .000511376           R-squared     =  0.2817 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1449 
       Total |      .01495    25     .000598           Root MSE      =  .02261 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.2162455   .1083195    -2.00   0.059    -.4415084    .0090173 
 d_taxaklag1 |   .4835035   .2101344     2.30   0.032     .0465052    .9205019 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.0610501    .214198    -0.29   0.778    -.5064993     .384399 
 d_taxaklag3 |   .1500358   .1571235     0.95   0.350    -.1767203    .4767919 
       _cons |   .1089093   .0552718     1.97   0.062    -.0060347    .2238534 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      27 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    23) =    1.72 
       Model |  .002758974     3  .000919658           Prob > F      =  0.1905 
    Residual |  .012287322    23  .000534231           R-squared     =  0.1834 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0768 
       Total |  .015046296    26  .000578704           Root MSE      =  .02311 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.1629179   .1046848    -1.56   0.133    -.3794749    .0536391 
 d_taxaklag1 |    .365787   .2032894     1.80   0.085    -.0547491    .7863231 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.1168732   .1579395    -0.74   0.467     -.443596    .2098496 
       _cons |   .0822737   .0533611     1.54   0.137    -.0281123    .1926596 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 /* significant at 95% conf level*/ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    25) =    5.81 
       Model |  .005889305     2  .002944653           Prob > F      =  0.0085 
    Residual |  .012671409    25  .000506856           R-squared     =  0.3173 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2627 
       Total |  .018560714    27  .000687434           Root MSE      =  .02251 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.1857107   .0940983    -1.97   0.060    -.3795098    .0080884 
 d_taxaklag1 |   .3444867    .136146     2.53   0.018     .0640886    .6248847 
       _cons |   .0933411   .0479495     1.95   0.063    -.0054127     .192095 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 obs /* Unrestricted model */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    24) =    3.73 
       Model |  .005901257     3  .001967086           Prob > F      =  0.0248 
    Residual |  .012659457    24  .000527477           R-squared     =  0.3179 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2327 
       Total |  .018560714    27  .000687434           Root MSE      =  .02297 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.1940501   .1108331    -1.75   0.093    -.4227983    .0346981 
 d_taxaklag1 |   .3524685   .1486658     2.37   0.026     .0456373    .6592997 
         obs |   .0001003   .0006663     0.15   0.882    -.0012748    .0014754 
       _cons |   .0958512   .0516792     1.85   0.076    -.0108095    .2025118 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak d_taxaklag1 /* Restricted model */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    26) =    6.95 
       Model |  .003915087     1  .003915087           Prob > F      =  0.0139 
    Residual |  .014645628    26  .000563293           R-squared     =  0.2109 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1806 
       Total |  .018560714    27  .000687434           Root MSE      =  .02373 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 d_taxaklag1 |   .3758053   .1425475     2.64   0.014     .0827948    .6688158 
       _cons |  -.0008986   .0045994    -0.20   0.847    -.0103528    .0085556 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 /* New unrestricted */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    25) =    5.81 
       Model |  .005889305     2  .002944653           Prob > F      =  0.0085 
    Residual |  .012671409    25  .000506856           R-squared     =  0.3173 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2627 
       Total |  .018560714    27  .000687434           Root MSE      =  .02251 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.1857107   .0940983    -1.97   0.060    -.3795098    .0080884 
 d_taxaklag1 |   .3444867    .136146     2.53   0.018     .0640886    .6248847 
       _cons |   .0933411   .0479495     1.95   0.063    -.0054127     .192095 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak d_taxaklag1, nocon /* New restricted */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    27) =    7.33 
       Model |  .003982871     1  .003982871           Prob > F      =  0.0116 
    Residual |   .01466713    27  .000543227           R-squared     =  0.2136 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1844 
       Total |      .01865    28  .000666071           Root MSE      =  .02331 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 d_taxaklag1 |   .3696399   .1365122     2.71   0.012       .08954    .6497398 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1, nocon 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    26) =    3.62 
       Model |  .004057877     2  .002028939           Prob > F      =  0.0412 
    Residual |  .014592123    26  .000561235           R-squared     =  0.2176 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1574 
       Total |      .01865    28  .000666071           Root MSE      =  .02369 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.0032937   .0090095    -0.37   0.718     -.021813    .0152257 
 d_taxaklag1 |   .3805519   .1419307     2.68   0.013     .0888092    .6722947 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Using Stata (version 10.0) and the Portuguese tax series for labor income displayed in 
Table 3.C, we have programmed the code below and obtained the following results: 
 
. gen llag1=taxal[_n-1] 
(1 missing value generated) 
 
. gen d_taxal = taxal[_n] - taxal[_n-1] 
(1 missing value generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag1 = d_taxal[_n-1] 
(2 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag2 = d_taxal[_n-2] 
(3 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag3 = d_taxal[_n-3] 
(4 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag4 = d_taxal[_n-4] 
(5 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag5 = d_taxal[_n-5] 
(6 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag6 = d_taxal[_n-6] 
(7 missing values generated) 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 d_taxallag2 d_taxallag3 d_taxallag4 d_taxallag5 d_taxallag6 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      23 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,    15) =    0.74 
       Model |  .032742861     7  .004677552           Prob > F      =  0.6415 
    Residual |  .094600619    15  .006306708           R-squared     =  0.2571 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0896 
       Total |   .12734348    22   .00578834           Root MSE      =  .07941 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0182977   .1401439    -0.13   0.898    -.3170073    .2804119 
 d_taxallag1 |    .216048   .2804512     0.77   0.453    -.3817196    .8138156 
 d_taxallag2 |  -.3763882   .2784373    -1.35   0.196    -.9698633    .2170869 
 d_taxallag3 |  -.0170997   .2826192    -0.06   0.953    -.6194884    .5852889 
 d_taxallag4 |  -.2771602   .2840836    -0.98   0.345    -.8826702    .3283497 
 d_taxallag5 |  -.1603486   .2714066    -0.59   0.563     -.738838    .4181408 
 d_taxallag6 |  -.1447434   .2590037    -0.56   0.585    -.6967968      .40731 
       _cons |  -.0446606   .0378391    -1.18   0.256    -.1253127    .0359916 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 d_taxallag2 d_taxallag3 d_taxallag4 d_taxallag5 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      24 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,    17) =    0.68 
       Model |  .025380463     6  .004230077           Prob > F      =  0.6650 
    Residual |  .105119538    17  .006183502           R-squared     =  0.1945 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0898 
       Total |  .130500002    23  .005673913           Root MSE      =  .07864 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0025538   .1308991    -0.02   0.985    -.2787268    .2736191 
 d_taxallag1 |    .260083   .2680611     0.97   0.346    -.3054766    .8256425 
 d_taxallag2 |  -.3542635   .2637814    -1.34   0.197    -.9107936    .2022666 
 d_taxallag3 |   .0329195    .276766     0.12   0.907    -.5510058    .6168448 
 d_taxallag4 |  -.2260995   .2623185    -0.86   0.401    -.7795432    .3273442 
 d_taxallag5 |  -.1101541   .2522788    -0.44   0.668    -.6424157    .4221076 
       _cons |  -.0314472   .0349892    -0.90   0.381    -.1052679    .0423735 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 d_taxallag2 d_taxallag3 d_taxallag4 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      25 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    19) =    0.82 
       Model |  .023060182     5  .004612036           Prob > F      =  0.5537 
    Residual |   .10751758    19   .00565882           R-squared     =  0.1766 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0401 
       Total |  .130577762    24   .00544074           Root MSE      =  .07523 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0098872   .1160158    -0.09   0.933    -.2527111    .2329366 
 d_taxallag1 |   .2945779   .2420895     1.22   0.239    -.2121212     .801277 
 d_taxallag2 |  -.3319949   .2499909    -1.33   0.200    -.8552318    .1912421 
 d_taxallag3 |   .0721565   .2480475     0.29   0.774    -.4470128    .5913258 
 d_taxallag4 |  -.2241825   .2351611    -0.95   0.352    -.7163803    .2680154 
       _cons |  -.0291482   .0312104    -0.93   0.362    -.0944722    .0361759 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 d_taxallag2 d_taxallag3 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      26 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,    21) =    0.83 
       Model |   .01780931     4  .004452328           Prob > F      =  0.5216 
    Residual |  .112768845    21  .005369945           R-squared     =  0.1364 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0281 
       Total |  .130578155    25  .005223126           Root MSE      =  .07328 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0441053   .1049737    -0.42   0.679      -.26241    .1741995 
 d_taxallag1 |   .3365945   .2310806     1.46   0.160    -.1439639    .8171528 
 d_taxallag2 |  -.2610369   .2322683    -1.12   0.274    -.7440653    .2219916 
 d_taxallag3 |   .0273535   .2279105     0.12   0.906    -.4466123    .5013193 
       _cons |  -.0341887   .0282752    -1.21   0.240    -.0929903    .0246128 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 d_taxallag2 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      27 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    23) =    1.04 
       Model |  .015872724     3  .005290908           Prob > F      =  0.3924 
    Residual |  .116688907    23  .005073431           R-squared     =  0.1197 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0049 
       Total |  .132561631    26  .005098524           Root MSE      =  .07123 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0272543   .0926978    -0.29   0.771    -.2190144    .1645057 
 d_taxallag1 |   .3372613   .2125824     1.59   0.126    -.1024989    .7770216 
 d_taxallag2 |  -.2110905   .2146559    -0.98   0.336      -.65514     .232959 
       _cons |  -.0271454   .0256281    -1.06   0.301    -.0801612    .0258705 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    25) =    1.39 
       Model |   .01364945     2  .006824725           Prob > F      =  0.2679 
    Residual |  .122825408    25  .004913016           R-squared     =  0.1000 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0280 
       Total |  .136474858    27  .005054624           Root MSE      =  .07009 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0579975   .0832506    -0.70   0.492    -.2294553    .1134602 
 d_taxallag1 |   .3271157   .1970997     1.66   0.109    -.0788188    .7330502 
       _cons |  -.0311207   .0234976    -1.32   0.197    -.0795149    .0172736 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxal llag1 obs /* Unrestricted model */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      29 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    26) =    4.29 
       Model |  .038023039     2   .01901152           Prob > F      =  0.0245 
    Residual |  .115129652    26  .004428064           R-squared     =  0.2483 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1904 
       Total |  .153152691    28  .005469739           Root MSE      =  .06654 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.3592031   .1435736    -2.50   0.019     -.654323   -.0640833 
         obs |  -.0083685   .0028558    -2.93   0.007    -.0142388   -.0024982 
       _cons |   .0312119   .0270986     1.15   0.260    -.0244901    .0869138 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal /* Restricted model */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      29 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  0,    28) =    0.00 
       Model |           0     0           .           Prob > F      =       . 
    Residual |  .153152691    28  .005469739           R-squared     =  0.0000 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0000 
       Total |  .153152691    28  .005469739           Root MSE      =  .07396 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _cons |  -.0168966   .0137336    -1.23   0.229    -.0450285    .0112354 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 /* New unrestricted */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      29 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    27) =    0.00 
       Model |  6.2493e-07     1  6.2493e-07           Prob > F      =  0.9917 
    Residual |  .153152066    27  .005672299           R-squared     =  0.0000 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0370 
       Total |  .153152691    28  .005469739           Root MSE      =  .07531 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |   .0008821   .0840372     0.01   0.992     -.171548    .1733121 
       _cons |  -.0166859   .0244626    -0.68   0.501    -.0668789    .0335072 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal, nocon /* New restricted */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      29 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  0,    29) =    0.00 
       Model |           0     0           .           Prob > F      =       . 
    Residual |     .161432    29  .005566621           R-squared     =  0.0000 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0000 
       Total |     .161432    29  .005566621           Root MSE      =  .07461 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxal llag1, nocon 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      29 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    28) =    1.01 
       Model |  .005640849     1  .005640849           Prob > F      =  0.3226 
    Residual |  .155791151    28   .00556397           R-squared     =  0.0349 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0005 
       Total |     .161432    29  .005566621           Root MSE      =  .07459 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |   .0479118   .0475842     1.01   0.323      -.04956    .1453836 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix D - Stata Code and Results for the Spanish Tax Series  
Using Stata (version 10.0) and the Spanish tax series for capital income displayed in 
Table 3.C, we have programmed the code below and obtained the following results: 
 
. gen klag1=taxak[_n-1] 
(1 missing value generated) 
 
. gen d_taxak = taxak[_n] - taxak[_n-1] 
(1 missing value generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag1 = d_taxak[_n-1] 
(2 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag2 = d_taxak[_n-2] 
(3 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag3 = d_taxak[_n-3] 
(4 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag4 = d_taxak[_n-4] 
(5 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag5 = d_taxak[_n-5] 
(6 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxaklag6 = d_taxak[_n-6] 
(7 missing values generated) 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 d_taxaklag3 d_taxaklag4 d_taxaklag5 d_taxaklag6 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      23 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,    15) =    1.05 
       Model |  .163921404     7  .023417343           Prob > F      =  0.4412 
    Residual |  .335697019    15  .022379801           R-squared     =  0.3281 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0145 
       Total |  .499618424    22  .022709928           Root MSE      =   .1496 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.1753642   .1920402    -0.91   0.376    -.5846881    .2339598 
 d_taxaklag1 |  -.3363841   .2718885    -1.24   0.235    -.9159008    .2431326 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.0353507    .275713    -0.13   0.900     -.623019    .5523177 
 d_taxaklag3 |   .0886668   .2671881     0.33   0.745    -.4808312    .6581648 
 d_taxaklag4 |   -.027351    .240194    -0.11   0.911    -.5393125    .4846105 
 d_taxaklag5 |  -.0865958   .1686252    -0.51   0.615    -.4460118    .2728203 
 d_taxaklag6 |  -.1658343   .1184192    -1.40   0.182    -.4182389    .0865703 
       _cons |   .0218392   .0934072     0.23   0.818    -.1772536     .220932 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 d_taxaklag3 d_taxaklag4 d_taxaklag5 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      24 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,    17) =    0.90 
       Model |  .120720472     6  .020120079           Prob > F      =  0.5167 
    Residual |  .379663351    17  .022333138           R-squared     =  0.2413 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0265 
       Total |  .500383822    23  .021755818           Root MSE      =  .14944 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.1459113    .175643    -0.83   0.418    -.5164856     .224663 
 d_taxaklag1 |  -.4086249   .2568795    -1.59   0.130    -.9505932    .1333435 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.1037689   .2653162    -0.39   0.701    -.6635372    .4559995 
 d_taxaklag3 |   .0431461   .2396954     0.18   0.859    -.4625669    .5488592 
 d_taxaklag4 |   .0662589   .1676011     0.40   0.698    -.2873486    .4198664 
 d_taxaklag5 |   .0607884   .1173731     0.52   0.611    -.1868473     .308424 
       _cons |   .0238861   .0859968     0.28   0.785    -.1575513    .2053235 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 d_taxaklag3 d_taxaklag4 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      25 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    19) =    1.24 
       Model |  .125727893     5  .025145579           Prob > F      =  0.3300 
    Residual |  .385664093    19   .02029811           R-squared     =  0.2459 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0474 
       Total |  .511391986    24  .021307999           Root MSE      =  .14247 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.1593357   .1509256    -1.06   0.304    -.4752267    .1565552 
 d_taxaklag1 |  -.3896066   .2364605    -1.65   0.116    -.8845241    .1053108 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.0884011   .2274021    -0.39   0.702    -.5643592    .3875569 
 d_taxaklag3 |   .0090088    .159503     0.06   0.956    -.3248347    .3428523 
 d_taxaklag4 |   .0124218   .1116517     0.11   0.913     -.221268    .2461115 
       _cons |   .0235798   .0749792     0.31   0.757    -.1333534     .180513 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 d_taxaklag3 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      26 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,    21) =    1.91 
       Model |  .140772492     4  .035193123           Prob > F      =  0.1456 
    Residual |  .386177026    21  .018389382           R-squared     =  0.2671 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1276 
       Total |  .526949518    25  .021077981           Root MSE      =  .13561 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |   -.156462   .1294054    -1.21   0.240    -.4255751    .1126512 
 d_taxaklag1 |  -.3988164   .1969508    -2.02   0.056    -.8083979    .0107652 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.1122916   .1489177    -0.75   0.459     -.421983    .1973998 
 d_taxaklag3 |   .0034669   .1060327     0.03   0.974    -.2170402    .2239739 
       _cons |   .0206916   .0660128     0.31   0.757    -.1165896    .1579728 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 /* significant at 90% conf level*/ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      27 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    23) =    2.58 
       Model |  .137907637     3  .045969212           Prob > F      =  0.0780 
    Residual |  .409481965    23  .017803564           R-squared     =  0.2519 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1544 
       Total |  .547389601    26  .021053446           Root MSE      =  .13343 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |   -.228566   .1076964    -2.12   0.045    -.4513529   -.0057791 
 d_taxaklag1 |  -.2532328    .135046    -1.88   0.074    -.5325967    .0261311 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.1786235    .097047    -1.84   0.079    -.3793805    .0221336 
       _cons |   .0526223   .0586509     0.90   0.379    -.0687062    .1739509 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 obs /* Unrestricted model */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      27 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,    22) =    3.26 
       Model |  .203837357     4  .050959339           Prob > F      =  0.0303 
    Residual |  .343552245    22  .015616011           R-squared     =  0.3724 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2583 
       Total |  .547389601    26  .021053446           Root MSE      =  .12496 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.5716621   .1950773    -2.93   0.008    -.9762277   -.1670965 
 d_taxaklag1 |  -.1404131   .1378817    -1.02   0.320    -.4263622    .1455361 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.1070384   .0973379    -1.10   0.283    -.3089048     .094828 
         obs |   -.013294   .0064699    -2.05   0.052    -.0267118    .0001238 
       _cons |   .4601134   .2057847     2.24   0.036      .033342    .8868849 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 /* Restricted model */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      27 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    24) =    1.41 
       Model |  .057716175     2  .028858087           Prob > F      =  0.2626 
    Residual |  .489673427    24  .020403059           R-squared     =  0.1054 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0309 
       Total |  .547389601    26  .021053446           Root MSE      =  .14284 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 d_taxaklag1 |  -.1920224   .1412338    -1.36   0.187    -.4835147    .0994698 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.1662664   .1037035    -1.60   0.122    -.3802998    .0477671 
       _cons |  -.0565791   .0301352    -1.88   0.073    -.1187751     .005617 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2 /* New unrestricted */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      27 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    23) =    2.58 
       Model |  .137907637     3  .045969212           Prob > F      =  0.0780 
    Residual |  .409481965    23  .017803564           R-squared     =  0.2519 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1544 
       Total |  .547389601    26  .021053446           Root MSE      =  .13343 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |   -.228566   .1076964    -2.12   0.045    -.4513529   -.0057791 
 d_taxaklag1 |  -.2532328    .135046    -1.88   0.074    -.5325967    .0261311 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.1786235    .097047    -1.84   0.079    -.3793805    .0221336 
       _cons |   .0526223   .0586509     0.90   0.379    -.0687062    .1739509 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxak d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2, nocon /* New restricted */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      27 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    25) =    0.54 
       Model |  .024177146     2  .012088573           Prob > F      =  0.5904 
    Residual |  .561594825    25  .022463793           R-squared     =  0.0413 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0354 
       Total |  .585771972    27  .021695258           Root MSE      =  .14988 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 d_taxaklag1 |  -.0855224   .1357168    -0.63   0.534    -.3650363    .1939915 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.1071991   .1036865    -1.03   0.311    -.3207453    .1063472 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxak klag1 d_taxaklag1 d_taxaklag2, nocon 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      27 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    24) =    3.06 
       Model |  .161958287     3  .053986096           Prob > F      =  0.0477 
    Residual |  .423813684    24  .017658904           R-squared     =  0.2765 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1860 
       Total |  .585771972    27  .021695258           Root MSE      =  .13289 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxak |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       klag1 |  -.1437965   .0514796    -2.79   0.010    -.2500451   -.0375478 
 d_taxaklag1 |  -.2533493   .1344962    -1.88   0.072    -.5309357    .0242371 
 d_taxaklag2 |  -.1866958   .0962357    -1.94   0.064    -.3853165    .0119248 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 128 
Using Stata (version 10.0) and the Spanish tax series for labor income displayed in Table 
3.C, we have programmed the code below and obtained the following results: 
 
. gen llag1=taxal[_n-1] 
(1 missing value generated) 
 
. gen d_taxal = taxal[_n] - taxal[_n-1] 
(1 missing value generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag1 = d_taxal[_n-1] 
(2 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag2 = d_taxal[_n-2] 
(3 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag3 = d_taxal[_n-3] 
(4 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag4 = d_taxal[_n-4] 
(5 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag5 = d_taxal[_n-5] 
(6 missing values generated) 
 
. gen d_taxallag6 = d_taxal[_n-6] 
(7 missing values generated) 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 d_taxallag2 d_taxallag3 d_taxallag4 d_taxallag5 d_taxallag6 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      23 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,    15) =    6.66 
       Model |  .017624074     7  .002517725           Prob > F      =  0.0011 
    Residual |  .005669403    15   .00037796           R-squared     =  0.7566 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6430 
       Total |  .023293477    22  .001058794           Root MSE      =  .01944 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0153266   .0652565    -0.23   0.817    -.1544175    .1237642 
 d_taxallag1 |   1.097158   .2507144     4.38   0.001     .5627729    1.631543 
 d_taxallag2 |  -.1818663   .2709754    -0.67   0.512    -.7594367    .3957041 
 d_taxallag3 |  -.4115737   .2666079    -1.54   0.143    -.9798349    .1566876 
 d_taxallag4 |   .6089423   .2845773     2.14   0.049     .0023802    1.215504 
 d_taxallag5 |  -.2227388   .2365954    -0.94   0.361      -.72703    .2815524 
 d_taxallag6 |   .0808106   .1935787     0.42   0.682    -.3317927    .4934139 
       _cons |  -.0000405   .0249038    -0.00   0.999    -.0531218    .0530407 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 d_taxallag2 d_taxallag3 d_taxallag4 d_taxallag5 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      24 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,    17) =    7.10 
       Model |  .017882795     6  .002980466           Prob > F      =  0.0006 
    Residual |  .007132828    17  .000419578           R-squared     =  0.7149 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6142 
       Total |  .025015624    23  .001087636           Root MSE      =  .02048 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |   .0483342   .0575378     0.84   0.413    -.0730599    .1697283 
 d_taxallag1 |   .7981378   .2096548     3.81   0.001     .3558048    1.240471 
 d_taxallag2 |   .0681079   .2521833     0.27   0.790    -.4639523    .6001681 
 d_taxallag3 |  -.4369272   .2804839    -1.56   0.138    -1.028696    .1548421 
 d_taxallag4 |   .2972713   .2381788     1.25   0.229     -.205242    .7997846 
 d_taxallag5 |  -.0380006   .1983246    -0.19   0.850    -.4564289    .3804277 
       _cons |  -.0251394    .021151    -1.19   0.251     -.069764    .0194852 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 d_taxallag2 d_taxallag3 d_taxallag4 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      25 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    19) =    8.19 
       Model |  .021676572     5  .004335314           Prob > F      =  0.0003 
    Residual |  .010052466    19  .000529077           R-squared     =  0.6832 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5998 
       Total |  .031729038    24  .001322043           Root MSE      =    .023 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0365576   .0534485    -0.68   0.502    -.1484267    .0753115 
 d_taxallag1 |   .7072243    .231484     3.06   0.007     .2227228    1.191726 
 d_taxallag2 |    .111992   .2812483     0.40   0.695    -.4766675    .7006514 
 d_taxallag3 |  -.0634263   .2654335    -0.24   0.814    -.6189851    .4921325 
 d_taxallag4 |    .167892   .2148096     0.78   0.444    -.2817097    .6174937 
       _cons |   .0064835   .0193343     0.34   0.741    -.0339836    .0469507 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 d_taxallag2 d_taxallag3 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      26 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,    21) =   11.31 
       Model |  .022954981     4  .005738745           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .010659364    21  .000507589           R-squared     =  0.6829 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6225 
       Total |  .033614345    25  .001344574           Root MSE      =  .02253 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0155311    .046803    -0.33   0.743    -.1128632    .0818011 
 d_taxallag1 |   .7171052   .2260321     3.17   0.005     .2470456    1.187165 
 d_taxallag2 |   .0450974   .2490101     0.18   0.858    -.4727475    .5629422 
 d_taxallag3 |    .081543   .2043323     0.40   0.694    -.3433892    .5064753 
       _cons |  -.0004699   .0167548    -0.03   0.978    -.0353134    .0343735 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 d_taxallag2 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      27 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    23) =   18.85 
       Model |  .026838898     3  .008946299           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .010916508    23  .000474631           R-squared     =  0.7109 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6731 
       Total |  .037755406    26  .001452131           Root MSE      =  .02179 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0003291   .0402064    -0.01   0.994    -.0835024    .0828441 
 d_taxallag1 |   .6746641   .1953296     3.45   0.002      .270594    1.078734 
 d_taxallag2 |   .1241542    .191168     0.65   0.522    -.2713068    .5196152 
       _cons |  -.0059085   .0142681    -0.41   0.683    -.0354244    .0236074 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 /* significant at 99%*/ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    25) =   33.80 
       Model |  .035052322     2  .017526161           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .012962641    25  .000518506           R-squared     =  0.7300 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7084 
       Total |  .048014963    27  .001778332           Root MSE      =  .02277 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0330311   .0369682    -0.89   0.380    -.1091687    .0431064 
 d_taxallag1 |   .8376721   .1050226     7.98   0.000     .6213741     1.05397 
       _cons |   .0069685   .0130415     0.53   0.598    -.0198909    .0338279 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 obs /* Unrestricted model */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    24) =   30.86 
       Model |  .038130189     3  .012710063           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .009884775    24  .000411866           R-squared     =  0.7941 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7684 
       Total |  .048014963    27  .001778332           Root MSE      =  .02029 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0437677   .0331813    -1.32   0.200    -.1122505    .0247152 
 d_taxallag1 |   .4269552   .1770152     2.41   0.024     .0616139    .7922966 
         obs |   -.002458   .0008992    -2.73   0.012    -.0043138   -.0006022 
       _cons |   .0532758   .0205438     2.59   0.016     .0108754    .0956762 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal d_taxallag1 /* Restricted model */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    26) =   67.33 
       Model |  .034638377     1  .034638377           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .013376587    26  .000514484           R-squared     =  0.7214 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7107 
       Total |  .048014963    27  .001778332           Root MSE      =  .02268 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 d_taxallag1 |   .8504255   .1036438     8.21   0.000     .6373825    1.063468 
       _cons |  -.0040201   .0043224    -0.93   0.361    -.0129049    .0048646 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1 /* New unrestricted */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    25) =   33.80 
       Model |  .035052322     2  .017526161           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .012962641    25  .000518506           R-squared     =  0.7300 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7084 
       Total |  .048014963    27  .001778332           Root MSE      =  .02277 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0330311   .0369682    -0.89   0.380    -.1091687    .0431064 
 d_taxallag1 |   .8376721   .1050226     7.98   0.000     .6213741     1.05397 
       _cons |   .0069685   .0130415     0.53   0.598    -.0198909    .0338279 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg d_taxal d_taxallag1, nocon /* New restricted */ 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    27) =   66.81 
       Model |  .034201358     1  .034201358           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .013821642    27  .000511913           R-squared     =  0.7122 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7015 
       Total |  .048022999    28  .001715107           Root MSE      =  .02263 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 d_taxallag1 |   .8380426    .102528     8.17   0.000     .6276726    1.048413 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg d_taxal llag1 d_taxallag1, nocon 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      28 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    26) =   34.62 
       Model |  .034912317     2  .017456159           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .013110682    26  .000504257           R-squared     =  0.7270 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7060 
       Total |  .048022999    28  .001715107           Root MSE      =  .02246 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_taxal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       llag1 |  -.0144032     .01213    -1.19   0.246    -.0393368    .0105305 
 d_taxallag1 |   .8472406   .1020529     8.30   0.000      .637468    1.057013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
